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Abstract 
Since the industrial revolution, development has been at the center of politics 
and politics at the center of development. Whether democratic type of 
government or autocratic perform better has been discussed among 
economists and political scientists alike for years. The emergence of 
autocratic governments in South East Asia as champions in bringing fast 
growth has fueled the debate even more. Many dictatorships have made the 
success of these countries as a tool to question the attributes of democracy 
and in return legitimize their grip. Even though, democracy has its own merit 
irrespective of whether it brings fast growth or not, it is still a worthy cause to 
learn about its effectiveness more. Development and poverty alleviation have 
been the allure to my choice in studying Economics and my motivation to 
pursue my thesis in a subject that has been always closer to my heart.  
Does democracy promote economic development? I review recent attempts to 
address this question. There is no consensus among economists, policy 
makers and political scientists as to how democratic properties of a regime in 
a country can bring a fast economic growth. Their answers are dependent on 
the methodology, definitions of democracy and development and data set 
taken. I discussed the concept of democracy, the channels of growth that it 
can affect and then forwarded the empirical findings  
Moreover, I have used in my empirical analysis fuzzy set qualitative 
comparative analysis [fsQCA], a rather fresh method of understanding 
causality and finding various paths to arrive at an outcome rather than 
solitary way propagated by other conventional methods. I included as many 
countries as possible so that many consistent paths of arriving at the outcome 
of development can be identified.   
The findings of my thesis positively indicate that one country can have a 
democracy in combination of different conditions in distinction to others, and 
achieve development. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Introduction 
There is a long sustained curiosity among economists and political scientists 
whether democracy promotes economic development and economic 
development brings democratic transition. There is a wide array of studies 
that has reported that there is positive association between the two while 
others have found that if there is any it is a negative relationship. The major 
differences arise from the difference in the formation of the theories, the 
amount and quality used and the research methodology. 
As a citizen of a country that is in struggle of figuring out how and using which 
policy approaches to come out of poverty and most of its history under 
different kinds of dictatorship, the question of the relationship between 
democracy and development is always at the head of public discussion and it 
was also the forefront of my decision to pursue the study of economics and 
hence also my main motivation for my research hypothesis. By choosing and 
doing a research on the problem, it was my hope that I will learn more about 
it. 
1.2. Hypothesis 
One hypothesis about the relationship between democracy and economic 
growth is that its lack of it in one country leads to a higher economic growth 
than its democratic counterpart. This hypothesis has been considered as valid 
because of the fast growth countries in South East Asia have exhibited. 
Amongst many, Amartya Sen has called this hypothesis the “Lee-thesis” [Sen, 
1999], after the late Singaporean Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, who 
unequivocally voiced this outlook. However, a survey of the literature on the 
topic makes it clear that many alternative hypotheses with different degrees 
that can be proposed about the relationship between development and 
democracy.  My hypothesis is democracy can also lead to development and 
there is no exclusivity to dictatorship when it comes to achieve higher 
economic growth. 
2	  
	  
1.3. Research question and design 
Due to the importance of governments and their form of institutional 
organization in bringing in economic development, different economists have 
made many discussions on whether the effect is positive or negative. 
Among the studies and observations carried after the Second World War, 
many have come with different and sometimes very contradictory empirical 
result on the role democracy plays in economic development. There are 
arrays of studies that support either a democratic form of government or 
equally authoritative type of government. Most previous work uses cross-
sectional regression analysis to investigate the causal relationship between 
democracy and development. 
In my thesis, I will revisit these and examine the empirical relationship 
between this important issue of whether democracy brings economic 
development by using rather recent methodology, the fuzzy set qualitative 
comparative analysis [fsQCA], a method of analyzing causality which I found 
has not been used in many of the literature I reviewed and which is still 
seldom used in economic research papers in general. 
1.4. Approach, Methodology and contribution 
My main focus will be to assess the effect of democracy on the trend of 
economic development over a period of time rather than on the economic 
development that arises as a result of dynamic change in type of governments, 
transitional crisis or external shocks. In keeping with this approach, I will 
analyze a panel data of countries using fsQCA to find if there is evidence that 
supports my claim that democracy can also foster economic development and 
what channels it uses. 
I will use as many countries in the world as possible of which there is a full 
data set in the period from 2000 to 2013 consisting of 156 countries. The data 
is mostly made up from aggregated variables at country level from various 
data of the World Bank, UNDP’s Human Development Index, Freedom House 
Political Rights Index, Barro-Lee data set on education attainment and 
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Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom. The data is calibrated so as 
to be used for fsQCA analysis. Chapter Four will comprehensively go through 
the various variables, source and way of calibration in addition to the analysis 
of the result. 
My method of analysis will differentiate itself from the literature in some 
aspects. However, aside from the elements that arise from the novelty of my 
approach in using fsQCA to investigate the causality with all its advantages, 
shortcomings and unfamiliarity, this thesis draws heavily on the political and 
economic literature of aggregate effects of democracy on economic 
development both directly and indirectly through other channels. Certain 
aspects of the relationship cannot be addressed using only the conventional 
statistical tools. It has to be explored with new approaches and methods when 
they are available. This will give more understanding of the subject matter 
and more robust and significant results can be obtained as a result. The 
trepidation around the comparative value of measurable versus qualitative 
data echoes a bigger discussion over the comparative usefulness of science in 
analyzing a situation. Omitting qualitative data like state of democracy in one 
country would be to neglect from considering an entire body of knowledge. 
The complementary nature of a statistical analysis and a case study 
encourages one to explore other popular methods used dominantly in other 
social sciences. This will enable one to draw generalizations of a causal effect, 
simultaneously gaining rigorous understanding of the instruments and 
procedures behind this causal effect, or possibly the absence of any. Because 
of the lack of robustness in statistical research on correlation between 
democracy and development, and the resulting differences in the findings, it is 
fruitful to add and try other strategies in order to come closer to the actual 
nature of the relationship. Yet, the full clarification of the relationship cannot 
be achieved solely through this thesis, mainly because of the still early 
development of the method. Nonetheless, it is my hope that it will provide an 
important supplement to the discussion. 
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1.5. Outline of the thesis 
This thesis consists of a total of five chapters. Chapter Two gives a synopsis of 
the current theoretic and empirical research on the field. It emphases on the 
literature on development and democracy and gives a concise presentation of 
the most significant contributions and central findings in relation to the 
nature of the democracy-development connection. It gives the theoretical 
framework, drawing on concept of different economic and democracy 
determinants. Democracy’s components like elections, political rights and 
civil liberties and its effect on accountability, stability [or instability], human 
capital and special interest groups will be discussed. It also highlights 
important empirical contributions in theorizing democracy, as well as 
important findings on democracy’s consequence on economic growth and the 
provision of public goods. Chapter Three frameworks the research method.  
The advantage of fsQCA to other conventional statistical methods, tools of 
analyses, interpretations and notations will be explained. Whilst, Chapter 
Four provides formalization of the data, variables and concepts used in this 
thesis and it presents the analysis and results from the study. Lastly, Chapter 
Five recaps the most critical findings and draw conclusions from this thesis, 
as well as recommending areas for further exploration. 
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2. Democracy and Development :   
Literature Review 
2.1. Background 
Academic works done on political, social, and economic development has 
grown rapidly in recent years. Economists, political scientists, and sociologists 
altogether have made this region of research one of the most vigorous and 
productive in the social sciences. The literature on democracy and 
development methodically integrates principles of political science and 
economics into a sole research schema so that to get an understanding of the 
interaction between politics and economics, particularly, on the relationship 
between democracy and economic performance. 
Many research results have tried to analytically find in what way democracy 
or form of government in general constitute the political foundation of 
economic management and affect not only economic development, but also the 
economic elements of growth, such as inflation, investment, human capital, 
income disparity, property rights, and population growth. My literature 
review discourses theoretic and empirical findings in both the direct and 
indirect effects on economic growth of democracy. Democracy has been both 
extolled as an instrument for contentment and prosperity, and imputed for 
hindering capital formation and the long-term growth of countries. 
2.2. Definition & Measurement of Key Concepts 
2.2.1. Defining Democracy 
Defining democracy has not been an easy undertaking. Many governments, 
scholars and individuals have come with different definitions sometimes to 
the point that it is beyond recognizable compared to the consensus of its 
meaning. Even countries like North Korea put in their official name the word 
democratic and go even further to claim that they are the true democracy. 
Keeping that absurdity aside, democracy, in my thesis, if not Abraham 
Lincoln’s famous definition, “democracy is a government of the people, by the 
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people, and for the people”, it is meant to be the more theoretically defined 
meaning of it. When examining the notion of democracy, it might be important 
to start with bearing in mind whether democracy is defined institutionally or 
substantively as this has ramifications also for the other important matters 
raised concerning dichotomous versus continuous definition [of democracy], 
the limitations of the democracy concept and the its logical structure. 
Democracy is defined by Schumpeter [1947], at the forefront of institutional 
definition, as "…the institutional arrangement for arriving at political 
decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a 
competitive struggle for the people’s vote". This is a minimalist or thin and 
procedural definition of democracy. Lately, Adam Przeworski and colleagues 
have debated strongly in favor of a minimalist, institutionally based 
democracy definition [2000]. They, for example, define democracy simply as 
a political regime in which “those who govern are selected through contested 
elections”.  The benefits of minimalist, institutional definitions are analytical 
rigor and accuracy, which alleviate ensuing difficulties of operationalizing 
democracy for empirical research [Przeworski et al., 2000]. Thus, perhaps the 
paramount case for outlining democracy institutionally is the demand to move 
beyond intuition towards stringent empirical measurement; a minimalist 
theoretical explanation is pondered interesting somewhat because it is easy to 
operationalize. 
Meanwhile, many arguments denote elections alone are inadequate for 
securing democracy, even when contested elections are the key criterion. One 
needs extra institutional guarantees, and the democracy definition needs to be 
broadened. Hence, at the opposite end of the scale is the broader or thick 
concept of democracy, which includes a wide range of features for a country to 
qualify as democratic. Diamond [1996] promotes the concept of liberal 
democracy, and argues that a regime must support political participation 
through other means than solely elections. He argues that for a country to be 
democratic, it must hold free and fair elections with universal adult suffrage, 
as well as boosting the importance of democratic institutions, such as the 
system of checks and balances, upholding a rule of law, the rights of citizens to 
information, to assembly, to speech etc. 
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The most influential academic definition is that of by Dahl’s concept of 
polyarchy [Dahl, 1971]. Polyarchy has eight components, or institutional 
requirements: almost all adult citizens have the right to vote; almost all adult 
citizens are eligible for public office; political leaders have the right to compete 
for votes; elections are free and fair; all citizens are free to form and join 
political parties and other organizations; all citizens are free to express 
themselves on all political issues; diverse sources of information about politics 
exist and are protected by law; and government policies depend on votes and 
other expressions of preference. 
Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub & Limongi [2000], however, disagree strongly 
with Dahl, and argue that concepts such as "accountability", "responsiveness", 
"responsibility" and "participation" should not be included in a definition of 
democracy as such. They believe that "the question whether or not regimes 
characterized by freedom of opinion, widespread participation, and repeated 
elections are in fact responsive is best left open for investigation, rather than 
resolved by definition" [Przeworski et al. 2000]. Instead, Przeworski [1991] 
propose another minimalist definition where democracy is "a system in which 
parties lose elections” 
Yet, these lists of institutional requirements do not recognize what democracy 
is, but rather identify vital rudiments of what a working democracy needs. 
Substantive democracy definitions take the public's role in political decision 
making as point of departure, rather than specific institutions. One prominent 
proponent of substantive democracy definitions is David Beetham [1994, 
1999]. He argues that definitions that consider democracy merely as a matrix 
of various institutions and rights are problematic. The persistent question is 
why specific institutions and rights are considered democratic? How can we 
answer that question without invoking a redundant argument? Accordingly, 
Beetham claims that “the core idea of democracy is that of popular rule or 
popular control over collective decision making” [Beetham 1999], and he 
furthermore adds political equality as a second criterion. Schmitter and Karl 
[1991] also argue “Democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are 
held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting 
indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected 
representatives.” 
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2.2.2. Measuring Democracy 
The first challenge facing a quantitative analysis of the patterns of democracy 
is to develop reliable and informative measures. Many types of measuring 
democracy, beyond the mere dichotomy of democracy and non-democracy, 
have surfaced because of the difference in stances in what actually constitutes 
democracy. 
In the literature on democracy, three indices for state of democracy have been 
used, namely Bollen’s liberal democracy index [Bollen, 1980], Gurr’s 
institutionalized democracy index, [Gurr, 1990] and Gastil’s political rights 
and civil liberties score [Gastil, 1985]. All treat democracy as continues 
variable rather than a dichotomous value of either presence or lack of 
democracy and as a result generating two important advantages, i.e. 
avoidance of arbitrary decisions in categorizing borderline cases of democracy 
[Bollen, 1989] and shares the concept that process of democratization is open 
ended [Dalton 1996]. While these variables do indeed retain terminal values 
showing the extremes of most free or most un-free, their use in studying the 
incremental effects of democracy on economics and the influence of economics 
on the consolidation or weakening of democracy is superior to a dichotomous 
democracy variable. [Feng, 2003] 
The Bollen Index 
Bollen describes liberal democracy as a function of two essential elements: 
political liberties and democratic rule. Political liberty, not to be 
misinterpreted as a state of democracy, is a function of people’s ability to 
freely express their political opinion without any fear of persecution through 
any medium and their ability to form or participate in their choice of political 
association or organization. Democratic rule is a function of a government’s 
accountability to the general population, and of the citizens’ entitlement to 
participate directly or via representatives in the government. The measure of 
the political freedom is based on freedom of group opposition, freedom of the 
press, and government sanctions. And that of democratic rule is constructed 
from executive selection, legislative selection, and election fairness. [Bollen, 
1993] 
9	  
	  
Polity Data and Institutionalized Democracy 
The data set developed by Gurr and associates offers a wide range of 
annualized variables, including centralization of political authority and 
identification of major shifts in polity or political regime. It covers a long span 
of historical periods from 1800 to the present. Gurr offers a composite index 
of institutionalized democracy, conceived of as the following elements: the 
presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express 
effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders, is the guarantee 
of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political 
participation, and the existence of institutionalized constraints on the 
exercise of executive power by the executive. In Gurr’s index, the value of 
democracy ranges from 0 to 10, with 10 representing the most democratic. 
[Gurr, Jaggers and Moore 1990]. 
The Gastil/Freedom House Index 
The most popular measure of democracy is the Freedom House political rights 
index developed by Gastil [1983–1989] and the Freedom House [1990–
present]. The index score nations on two separate seven-point scales 
measuring their levels of political rights and civil liberties. A country gets a 
score of 1 if political rights come closest to the ideals suggested by a checklist 
of questions, beginning with whether there are free and fair elections, whether 
those who are elected rule, whether there are competitive parties or other 
political groupings, whether the opposition plays an important role and has 
actual power, and whether minority groups have reasonable self-government 
or can participate in the government through informal consensus and 7 if it is 
un-free. The civil-liberties score also ranges from one to seven, with seven 
representing the most un-free. A country with a score of one enjoys freedom of 
association, assembly, demonstration, speech, and religion, as well as free and 
independent media and court systems. 
2.2.3. Development 
Defining development is a very difficult task at hand if not because that 
development is in terms and context, then its diverse definitions as it is the 
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most discussed subject in economics. One can allude to the simplest definitions 
of all that it is a progress from one state to higher state or form. The concept of 
prospering and progressing from one circumstance to alternative indicates 
that the first condition was of a lower order as compared to the final condition, 
which is to be desired as a goal or an achievement. As the dominant paradigm 
of development suggests that development must occur as a means ‘to escape 
from the undignified condition of underdevelopment’, there must first be a 
perception of the initial state being something lesser. 
In strictly economic terms, development has traditionally meant achieving 
sustained rates of growth of income per capita to enable a nation to expand its 
output at a rate faster than the growth rate of its population. Levels and rates 
of growth of real per capita gross national income [GNI] [monetary growth of 
GNI per capita minus the rate of inflation] are then used to measure the 
overall economic well-being of a population—how much of real goods and 
services is available to the average citizen for consumption and investment. 
[Todaro, 2009]. 
But development shouldn’t be just modification in gross value. The new read is 
that it should be planned as a two-dimensional method involving major 
changes in social structures, common attitudes, and national institutions, in 
addition because the acceleration of economic process, the reduction 
of difference, and thus the eradication of poorness. Development, in its essenc-
e, should represent the full scale of modification by that a complete social or-
ganization, tuned to the varied basic wants and evolving aspirations of peo-
ple and social teams at intervals that system, moves removed from a condition 
of life wide perceived as dissatisfactory toward a scenario or condition of 
life thought to be materially and spiritually higher. No one has identified the 
human goals of economic development as well as Amartya Sen, perhaps the 
leading thinker on the meaning of development. He argues that the “capability 
to function” is what really matters for status as a poor or non-poor person. 
Hence, he reiterates that income and wealth are not ends in themselves. As 
Sen puts it, “the expansion of commodity productions...are valued, ultimately, 
not for their own sake, but as means to human welfare and freedom.” 
Three basic components or core values serve as a conceptual basis and 
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practical guideline for understanding the inner meaning of development. 
These core values—sustenance or the ability to meet basic needs, self-esteem 
or right to be a person, and freedom from servitude or the ability to choose —
represent common goals sought by all individuals and societies. They relate to 
fundamental human needs that find their expression in almost all societies 
and cultures at all times. 
As a result of this paradigm shift, new methods of measuring development 
have evolved. The United Nations Development Program [UNDP] in its annual 
series of Human Development Reports presents the most widely used measure 
of the comparative status of socioeconomic development. The focus of the 
reports, which were introduced in 1990, is the formation and enhancement of 
its explanatory Human Development Index [HDI], which includes three 
elements of welfare: income, as measured by GDP per capita; longevity and 
health, as measured by life expectancy; and education, as measured by school 
enrollment and the level of literacy. In my thesis, I will use HDI to measure 
development rather than the conventional GDP per capita or PPP per capita. 
Another recent measurement is a more broader indicator: “inclusive wealth”. 
It is the second of its kind; the first was published in 2012. The report, over-
seen by Sir Partha Dasgupta of Cambridge University, puts a dollar value on 
three kinds of asset: “manufactured” capital [roads, buildings, machinery and 
so on]; human capital [people’s skills and health]; and natural capital 
[including forests and fossil fuels]. To calculate, for example, human capital, 
the UN uses figures on average years of schooling, the wages workers can 
command and the number of years they can expect to work before they retire 
[or die]. 
2.3. Theoretical Framework and Empirical findings 
2.3.1. Theoretical Framework 
Hobbes [1651] was the first to support the conflict view, that democracy 
hinders development. To Hobbes, absolutist governments were more probable 
towards improving public wellbeing merely because they could not else uphold 
their own interests. Huntington [1968] similarly endorses this opinion. He 
argues that democracies have frail and unstable political institutions and lend 
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themselves to popular demands at the expense of lucrative investments. 
Democratic governments are susceptible to requests for reallocation to lower-
income groups, and are encircled by rent-seekers for “directly unproductive 
profit-seeking activities” [Krueger 1974, Bhagwati 1982]. Non-democratic 
governments can apply coercively the difficult economic programs 
fundamental for growth, and overpower the growth-hindering demands of 
low-income earners and labor in general, as well as social volatilities because 
of ethnic, religious, and class strives. Democracies cannot quash such clashes. 
For economic progress, markets should come first and authoritarian regimes 
can easily facilitate such strategies. Furthermore, some level of development 
is a pre-requisite for democracy to function properly [Lipset’s 1959 
hypothesis]. All things considered, this view suggests that democracy is a 
luxury good that cannot be afforded by developing countries.1 
The arguments above lies on numerous assumptions, the main one of which is 
that if given power, authoritarian regimes would perform in a growth friendly 
manner. In that vein, some opposing instances are stipulated where dictators 
practiced their own welfare and failed presumably in Africa and the socialist 
world [de Haan and Siermann 1995, Alesina et al. 1996]. 
Proponents of democracy, instead, argue that rulers are likely robbers 
[Harrington 1656] and democratic institutions can act to constrain them 
[North 1990]. Greatest number of the suppositions of the conflict view can be 
refuted with good reasons [Sirowy and Inkeles 1990]. Implementation of the 
rule of law, contract execution and safeguarding property rights do not 
necessarily imply an authoritarian regime. The second has an inclination to 
repossess assets if it can expect a brief tenure [Olson 1993] or even in the 
long-run [Bhagwati 1995], for more fraudulent and excessive use of 
resources, internally unreliable policies, and momentary and precarious 
economic progress [Nelson 1987]. The incentive of citizens for work and 
invest, the efficient distribution of resources in the marketplace, and profit 
boosting private activity can be maintained with higher political rights and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Further advocates of the conflict view and firmer state authority on the economy comprise 
Galenson [1959], Andreski [1968], Huntington and Dominguez [1975], Rao [1984-5], and 
Haggard [1990]. 
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civil liberties. In addition, Bhagwati [1995] argues that democracies rarely 
engage in military conflict with each other, and this encourages world peace 
and economic growth. They are moreover more likely to provide less volatile 
economic performance.  
Among these conflicting views and inconsequential empirical results, it is 
likely that a purported skeptical outlook has appeared. The followers of this 
view debate that it is the institutional structure and organizations, before 
regimes as such, that matters for development. Developmental government 
policies can be founded all regimes. A sound leadership that will resolve 
collective action problems and be responsive to rapidly changing technical 
and market conditions is more essential for growth [Bardhan 1993]. Though 
he himself an adherent of democracy, Bhagwati [1995] maintains that 
markets can bring growth under both democratic and authoritarian regimes. 
Nonetheless, there have also been examples that the institutional structures 
under both regimes are plagued by not creating the “right” choices for their 
subjects. 
The democracy-growth question is more precise and focused today, thanks to 
accumulation of research and a growing list of country experiences [e.g., 
Russia, China, Latin America, and the Asian financial crunch]. Theory has 
retreated from traditional conflict vs. compatibility arguments, because 
different aspects of the broader institutions-growth problem have been 
recognized. For example, scholars have disjointed economic democracy from 
democracy. Elements like safeguarding of property rights, business, credit 
and labor market regulations, which were previously attributed to democracy, 
are now being treated as part of economic democracy. Study of economic 
freedom indicators from the Fraser Institute [by Gwartney and Lawson 2000] 
and including the Heritage Foundation [by O’Driscoll et al. 2003] has shown 
that economic freedom, with also its other aspects, is equally relevant to 
growth [Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu 2006]. Furthermore, Kaufman et al. 
[2003] introduced the governance aspect of the institutions problem. 
Formerly, factors such as rule of law, voice and accountability, government 
efficiency, political instability, corruption, and regulatory quality were either 
partly or totally attributed to democracy. These, too, are associated with 
higher growth. Recently, the World Bank initiated the “Doing Business” aspect 
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of the institutions problem. In particular Djankov et al [2005], Djankov, 
McLiesh and Shleifer [2005], and Botero et al [2004] benchmarked business 
regulations and quantified the easiness of private sector’s activity in the 
economies based on labor hiring and firing practices; ease of starting, 
registering and closing business; protecting investors and enforcing contracts; 
and dealing with licenses and paying taxes. 
Here one may feel that dissecting these aspects from democracy reduces its 
scope to multi-party and free elections merely. Democracy is more than free 
elections. First, empirical evidence shows that all the aspects of the 
institutions made precise above, i.e., economic democracy, governance and 
private sphere in the economy have high correlations with democracy. In 
other words, the mere existence of participatory democracy implies the 
broader institutions conducive to growth. As Rodrik [2000] argues, 
democratic regimes can be the meta institution for building market-
supporting institutions. 
Secondly, various studies find that democracy has enormous indirect effects 
on growth through human capital accumulation, income allocation, and 
political stability [see Baum and Lake 2003, Alesina et al. 1996]. Further 
more, Sturm and de Haan [2001] find that the presence of democracy in a 
country positively affects the level of economic freedom. Thus, on the question 
of democracy and growth, one should remember the larger connotations that 
include the channels, or the indirect effects, amid democracy and growth 
rather than one-to-one causation from regime to growth. 
Thirdly, as Bhagwati [1995] and Rodrik [2000] indicate, democracies deliver 
higher quality growth through numerous ways. Rodrik puts it in the following 
way: participatory democracies enable a higher-quality growth by allowing 
greater predictability and stability in the long-run, by being stronger against 
external shocks, and by bringing better distributional outcomes. Democratic 
institutions would help markets function “perfectly”, as is assumed in 
neoclassical economic models. As an extension to such arguments, the 
“volatility” channel has also been shown to be an important indirect effect of 
democracy on growth. Sah [1991] had argued that authoritarian regimes 
exhibit more volatile performance than democracies. Non- democratic 
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regimes are not a homogenous lot [de Haan et al, 1995, Alesina et al. 1996, 
Alesina and Perotti 1994], whereas democracies are more homogenous and 
can provide stable economic development. Such a concept also implies less 
volatile and long-standing economic progress. Quinn and Woolley [2001] hint 
the endogeneity between growth and volatility, while Mubarak [2005] 
analyzes this new channel in multi-equation framework and finds that higher 
levels of democracy increases growth through lower volatility. 
Lipset [1959] was a pioneer to look at the prospect of a causal connection 
between economic growth and democracy. He supported the view that as a 
regime experienced economic growth and reach a desired level of GDP per 
capita, a transition to democracy turns out to be more probable. From the time 
of Lipset’s suggestion, the relationship between economic growth and 
democracy has remained the topic of an animated discussion. Przeworski and 
Limongi [1997] examine two theories of economic growth and 
democratization in order to examine the resilience of democracy. They find 
two reasons for this potential relationship. One is endogenous; that develop-
ment has a positive impact on the stability of a democratic country. The other 
is exogenous; that democratic governance establishes itself independently of 
the level of economic development, but is more likely to survive in developed 
countries. Boix & Stokes [2003] challenge the conclusion of Przeworski & 
Limongi [1997], however, and argue that endogenous democratization also 
possesses explanatory power. They find evidence that there are certain 
"thresholds" of income levels that make countries more likely to embark on a 
democratic transition, hence, supporting both the exogenous and endogenous 
theories of democracy. 
On the other hand, on the inverted causal relationship - whether democracy 
contributes to increased levels of development, Przeworski & Limongi [1993] 
has found no evidence in the direction that whether democracy fosters or 
hinders economic growth. They point to the idea that there is a thin theory on 
the determinants of economic growth in general, making it even harder to 
identify the effect of politics. Taking into consideration the political 
differences between the regimes that have experienced development, they 
conclude that something else, even thought that something else stayed 
unanswered, rather than the type of regime that makes the difference how a 
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country performs. 
2.3.2. Empirical findings 
In the statistical findings on the relationship, which generally shows a mixed 
results, Przeworski & Limongi [1993] compare 18 statistical studies and 21 
findings where eight studies supported in favor of democracy, eight found 
evidence in favor of authoritarianism, and five discovered no difference. Their 
results and conclusions show, "that political institutions do matter for growth, 
but thinking in terms of regimes does not seem to capture the relevant 
differences" 
Pourgerami [1988] reports a positive association between his measure of 
democracy, which is constructed on the basis of the frequency of violations of 
human rights, and economic growth. Scully [1988] concludes that for 115 
market economies over the period 1960-80 politically open societies, which 
subscribe to political, civil and economic liberty, grow at three times the rate 
of societies in which these freedoms are restricted. For their group of 47 
countries Kormendi and Meguire [1985] find that countries in the high-civil 
liberty category experience about 1 percent greater annual economic growth. 
Similarly, Grier and Tullock [1989] conclude that repressive countries in 
Africa and the Americas have about a 1.5 percentage point lower annual 
growth rate than other countries included in their study. 
Barro [1989] presents results for a sample of 98 countries, which also 
indicate that restricted political rights are associated with lower per capita 
growth. Similar conclusions are reached by Dasgupta [1990] who claims, 
"political and civil liberties are positively and significantly correlated with per 
capita income and its progress" [Dasgupta, 1990]. Certainly, in his 
assessment of empirical growth studies, Levine [1993] determines, "political 
freedoms appear to be somewhat positively related to growth. 
The increasing availability of data and econometric techniques enabled 
researchers to explore more these issues empirically. The findings, though, 
extend a range of negative, insignificant and positive estimates, producing a 
conundrum. For instance, the distribution of results that Doucouliagos and 
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Ulubasoglu [2006] have collected from 470 regression estimates from 81 
democracy-growth studies shows that 16% of the estimates are negative and 
statistically significant, 20% of the estimates are negative and statistically 
insignificant, 38% of the estimates are positive and statistically insignificant, 
and 26% of the estimates are positive and statistically significant. This infers 
that three-fourth of the regressions have not been able to establish the 
“desired” positive and significant sign. It also implies that around half of the 
regression models have found significant estimates while the other half found 
insignificant estimates. These diverse outcomes are not unforeseen since 
research questions modeled are plausibly narrow and approach the problem 
from different angles. For example, while selected studies emphasis on the 
physical investment channel between democracy and growth, others look at 
human capital or political instability channels. Equally, some studies present 
structural estimates of a clearly designed model, while others center on the 
empirical regularities in the data. Consequently, the question is confounded 
with a range of estimates, which vary due to data sources, estimation 
methodologies, sample compositions, and time period. [Doucouliagos and 
Ulubasoglu , 2006] 
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Fig. 2.1.  Published Democracy Growth Effects, All Set [Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu, 2006] 
 
Fig. 2.2.  Published Democracy Growth Effects, Best Set 
More recently, Daron Acemoglu et al have showed that once the dynamics of 
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GDP are controlled for in a fixed effects OLS regression, there is an 
economically and statistically significant positive correlation between 
democracy and future GDP per capita. This result remains true in GMM 
estimates that account for any bias due to lagged dependent variables, as well 
as with semi-parametric estimators based on a propensity score for 
democratic transitions estimated using past lags of log GDP. Their preferred 
specifications imply that long-run GDP increases by about 20% following a 
democratic transition. [Daron Acemoglu et al, 2014] 
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3. Research Design and Methods  
As I have explained in the literature review, explaining the difficult task of 
measuring both democracy and development needs a stringent consideration 
in choosing which conditions and outcomes to choose from. As a result a very 
carefully and cleverly thought out research design is needed. In the beginning, 
I will explain the rational of using Qualitative Comparative Analysis in section 
3.1.1, henceforth abbreviated as QCA. Next, the motivation and explicit choice 
of the specific technique of fuzzy QCA [fsQCA] will be explained in 3.1.2, 
moreover I will discuss the concept of calibration and its importance in section 
3.1.3. Finally, the methods of analysis will be discussed in section 3.1.4.  
In 3.2.1. I will explain operationalization of the data, the steps taken and the 
choice of the conditions and outcomes will be discussed. And in the end, in 
section 3.2.2., I will explain my data, the source, and its characteristics,.  
3.1. Research Method 
3.1.1. Qualitative Comparative Analysis [QCA] 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis [fsQCA] is a method of attaining 
summarizations from data that are related with cases. It was developed by the 
renowned social scientist Prof. Charles C. Ragin, but has, till recently, 
economists have rarely applied it. According to Ragin [2008]: “The goal of 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis [QCA] is to derive a logically simplified 
statement describing the different combinations of conditions linked to an 
outcome.”  Each arrangement of conditions and same outcome is sometimes 
referred to as a type or a typological configuration [Rihoux and Ragin, 2009].  
Ragin argues that both traditional quantitative and qualitative approaches are 
not deemed specifically useful, since they either focus on analyzing a large 
number of cases with a small number of variables or on studying a small 
number of cases with a large number of variables [Ragin, 2000]. Findings 
based on too few observations in order to develop an accurate statistical 
model, whereas employing a completely qualitative approach is not 
considered feasible with regard to the time available to the researcher and the 
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impossibility to obtain in-depth knowledge with all cases [Ragin, 2008]. Thus, 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis [QCA] originally introduced by Charles 
Ragin in 1987, offers a solution by linking the quantitative to the qualitative 
analysis; cross-case patterns are qualitatively examined and quantitatively 
analyzed [Rihoux, 2003]. In this vein, Ragin [2007: 69] claims that QCA, or 
the configurationally comparative approach more generally, combines the 
strengths of within-case and cross-case analysis and is therefore particularly 
useful for medium‐N studies [Schneider & Wagemann, 2012]. 
The main reason I found it useful in my study is because of its particular 
conception of causality [Ragin, 2000]. In distinction to more conventional 
approaches on causation, causality is considered nonlinear, non-additive, non-
probabilistic and any type of permanent causality is rejected [Ragin, 1987]. 
Moreover, QCA emphasizes equifinality, basically meaning that various 
arrangements of causal conditions, or ‘paths’, are capable of generating the 
same outcome. This makes QCA a potent method in exploring social 
phenomena of ‘complex causality’ [Schneider & Wagemann, 2006]. In order to 
facilitate the systematic comparative analysis of complex cases, cases must be 
translated into configurations. A configuration is a specific combination of 
factors, also called conditions in QCA terminology, which produces a given 
outcome of interest [Rihoux & Ragin, 2009]. Within this method, QCA enables 
the identification of conditions that are necessary and conditions that are 
sufficient to produce the outcome. Whereas a necessary condition must 
always be present for an outcome to occur, the presence of a sufficient 
condition always leads to the outcome of interest. This analysis of necessity 
and sufficiency enables the researcher to model quite a high level of 
complexity with only a few conditions. Accordingly, Schneider & Wagemann 
[2010] argue that QCA’s sensitivity to causal complexity gives it an analytic 
edge over many statistical techniques of data analysis and they consider QCA 
to be the most systematic instrument to analyze complex causality and logical 
relations between causal factors and an outcome. 
Furthermore, QCA and its prescribed tools deliver an efficient instrument for 
conducting the significant amount of data involved in medium-­‐N case 
studies [Legewie, 2013]. This will help both in the analytical process and with 
regards to demonstrations of the outcome. Likewise, the methodical and 
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proper method of QCA raises the transparency and its ability to replicate 
analytical processes often obscured within conventional case study methods, 
which increases the reliability of findings and the persuasiveness of 
argumentation. Single case studies face major difficulties to engage in any 
form of generalization, the ultimate goal of QCA to ‘construct empirically 
grounded, theoretically relevant typologies of cases, advancing both general 
theoretical knowledge and understanding of historically specific diversity of 
empirical cases’ [Ragin, 2003] 
The logical number of possible causal combinations, also called the 
multidimensional vector space, is calculated by using the simple formula of 2k, 
with k being the number of causal conditions [Ragin, 2000]. 
3.1.2. Fuzzy-set QCA [fsQCA]: 
Conventional QCA methods has evolved both in its extension in 
accommodating other non‐dichotomous variables and its analytical skills. In 
QCA, a case can belong to multiple sets, in which a set is involved of all cases 
that show a certain attributes [e.g., democracy]. In the original application of 
QCA, it is a strictly binary Boolean language that uses to express the 
qualitative state of conditions and outcomes and set membership is thus crisp 
[either 1 or 0, i.e. full membership or non-membership], a method known as 
crisp-set QCA [csQCA] [Ragin, 1987]. This will make some aspects of research 
insufficient, as, in many cases, variables are continuous rather than 
dichotomous. The application of csQCA would thus be arbitrary and moreover, 
it would not allow for an assessment of the effect of the relative strengths of 
the independent variables/conditions [as they can only have two values] It is 
to this effect that fuzzy-set QCA [fsQCA] became the preferred method to test 
the formulated hypotheses in my thesis of causality between democracy and 
development. We can clearly understand that there are types of regimes 
between pure democracy and dictatorship as some countries fall in between 
the two as some give economic freedom some held elections even thought 
there are a dominant party and hence the opposition is curtailed from 
participation. In contrast to csQCA, set-membership in fsQCA is ‘fuzzy’ 
[interval scores between 1 and 0]: a case can thus be fully in [= 1.0], more in 
than out, neither in nor out, more out than in, or fully out of a set [= 0.0]. 
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Therefore, using a ‘fuzzy’ method makes it possible to permit the scaling of 
membership scores and thus allows partial membership [Ragin, 2009]. 
Based on the in-depth case knowledge the researcher determines the number 
of levels in fuzzy-sets [Ragin, 2009]. The most rudimentary is the three‐value-set 
[Ragin, 2009] that specifies three qualitative breakpoints: full membership 
[1], full non‐membership [0], and the crossover point [0.5]. However, as 
stated by Ragin [2008] the assignment of membership scores of 0.5 should 
preferably be avoided for theoretical, practical and technical reasons; in 
contrast to the scores of full‐membership [1.0] and full non-membership [0.0], 
the crossover point should only be a qualitative threshold and an emphasis 
should be given to the theory behind the crossover points. I will discus in the 
analysts the methods and ideas I used to assign membership thresholds in my 
study later in this chapter. In situations where researchers have a substantial 
amount of information about cases, and the nature of the evidence is not 
identical across cases, a four or six value scheme is considered more useful 
[Ragin, 2009]. The most important advantage of the specification of these 
qualitative anchors is that it allows making a distinction between relevant and 
irrelevant variation when assigning scores to cases [Ragin, 2009]. 
The basic principles of fsQCA [Yager et al, 2013] are: 
1. Conjunctural Causation: It is usually not just one postulated causal 
condition that by itself causes a desired outcome. Instead, it is a combination 
of causal conditions that causes a desired outcome. FsQCA can determine such 
a combination of causal conditions. Not all of the postulated causal conditions 
may be in a causal combination that produces a desired outcome. FsQCA can 
strip away the unneeded causal conditions in each causal combination.  
2. Equifinal Causation: There can be different combinations of causal 
conditions that produce a desired outcome. FsQCA can establish which causal 
combinations do this.  
3. Limited Diversity: Usually there are not enough cases available to provide 
instances for each of the possible causal combinations. Substantive knowledge 
provided by expert[s] during thought experiments— counterfactual analysis— 
supplements case-data.  
4. Causal asymmetry: Generally there is causal asymmetry between fsQCA 
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for a desired outcome and fsQCA for the complement of that outcome. 
Generally it is not the complements of the causal combinations associated 
with the desired outcome that are associated with the complement of the 
desired outcome.  
5. The Sufficiency of a Causal Combination is Not Black and White: Each 
winning causal combination is not 100% sufficient to be a cause of the desired 
outcome. FsQCA computes a fuzzy measure of sufficiency.  
6. The Same Set of Cases do not Have to be Used for Different Outcomes or for 
Different Objectives for the Same Outcome: Identify the best possible instances 
of the phenomenon to be explained and then study those instances [cases] in 
great depth. Casing is outcome driven, i.e. you can have different choices of 
cases for different kinds of studies: [a] Study for which there is only one case; 
[b] Study when there are a set of cases for the same outcome; [c] Study for 
which there are both negative and positive cases for the same outcome; [d] 
Study that uses the entire population [such a study seeks generalizations 
about the population]. According to Ragin [2008]: “It is wrong to label a study 
flawed simply because it omits negative cases, for there are many good 
reasons to study positive cases in isolation from negative cases.” Choosing 
appropriate cases should be done first, and this choice does not have to be 
done irreversibly, i.e. it can be modified during the entire fsQCA procedure.  
3.1.3. Methodology relevance to my thesis 
Fuzzy-set QCA gives numerous benefits. Primary, it is better fit than 
regression for investigating causal configurations- states in which variables 
have an effect only in combination with a high or low degree of one or more 
other factors. In regression analysis, causal configurations are evaluated 
through interaction terms. However, a small N restricts the number of 
interactions terms that can be incorporated in a regression model. 
In addition, the inconvenience of interpreting interaction terms with more 
variables makes modeling complex interactions problematic. Additionally, 
whilst evaluating interactions in regression, it requires that variables exhibit 
a multiplicative effect. QCA treats any case aspects that appear together 
systematically - in any quantity - as potentially interdependent. Secondly, 
fuzzy-set QCA permits us to distinguish several pathways to an outcome. 
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Correlational techniques such as regression treat the presence of an outcome 
[dependent variable] without a given cause [independent variable] as 
negative evidence for the strength of that causal justification. Consequently, a 
factor that has a control in a subset - but only a subset - of cases tends to 
become buried in regression outcomes with subdued coefficients and 
overestimated variance. In distinction, fuzzy-set QCA can disclose causal 
arrays that vary throughout subsets of cases. This method thereby lets one to 
study relatively sizeable datasets with more complex causal narratives than 
are normally probable with correlational techniques. Thirdly, while regression 
is suitable for examining tendency relationships- the common inclination of a 
specific factor to impact an outcome of interest, it is helpful to use fuzzy-set 
QCA in exploring a different kind of relationship: causal sufficiency. Fuzzy-set 
QCA assesses sufficiency via the logic of set-theoretic relations. Set theory is 
inherent [though often implicit rather than explicit] in much of social science 
[Ragin, 2000].  
3.1.4. Calibration of concepts 
In working to allot grades to conditions and outcomes of my data in a more 
effective and consistent system, the model and data need to be operationalized 
first [Kellstedt & Whitten, 2009, Ragin, 2000]. The next step involves the 
calibration of fuzzy-set membership so that the variables correspond to 
theories and external standards behind them [Glaesser & Cooper, 2013; 
Ragin, 2007]. This process, also referred to as ‘fuzzification’, comprises the 
trajectory of getting from base variable values [also called raw data] to 
condition or outcome set membership scores. Applications of fsQCA in most 
areas of the social sciences make use of two different calibration procedures; 
the method of direct assignment and the method of transformational or 
indirect assignment [although originally Ragin call the second one direct] 
[Thiem & Duşa, 2013]. In this research the method of transformational or 
indirect has been employed [as applied in Thiem & Duşa, 2013]. The direct 
method entails that fuzzy-set membership scores are directly arrived at 
through expert knowledge. With this in‐depth knowledge the three qualitative 
anchor points must be specified: full membership [1], full non-membership 
[0], and the crossover point [0.5] [Ragin, 2009]. These three breakpoints are 
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used to transform the original ratio or interval-scale values into fuzzy 
membership scores with the help of fs/QCA software, using transformations 
based on the log odds of full membership [Ragin, 2008]. Since this process is 
fundamentally interpretive, decisions have to be made transparent. I will 
come once again to the point of methods I used to benchmark the sets in 
subsequent sections. 
3.1.5. Data Analysis in fsQCA Methods. 
Next in line after the benchmarking of the threshold comes the calibration of 
the observations and analysis. The results are processed using fs/QCA data 
analysis software [version 2.5] [developed by Ragin, Drass & Davey, 2014] 
and STATA [developed by Longest and Vaisey]. In the data-analysis process of 
fsQCA four concepts are of particular importance and will be discussed next. 
First come the number‐of-cases threshold, meaning the researcher needs to chose 
those from the all the causal combination to be considered relevant [Ragin, 
2009]. The number of cases under study, the number of conditions, the degree 
of familiarity of the researcher with each case, and the degree of precision 
reached in calibrating the fuzzy-sets [Ragin, 2009] has to be considered. 
Next, the key set theoretic relation in the study of causal complexity is the 
‘subset relation’ [Ragin, 2000]. The subset relation involves the determination 
whether a combination of causal conditions [i.e. configuration] may be 
interpreted as sufficient or necessary for the outcome. With fuzzy-­‐sets, a 
subset can be established when membership scores in one set [e.g., one or a 
set of conditions] are consistently less than or equal to membership scores in 
another set [e.g., the outcome] [Xi ≤ Yi] [Ragin, 2009]. In addition, when 
other sets of cases have other relevant conditions in common also leading to 
the same outcome, then these cases constitute a subset of the outcome as well 
[Ragin, 2009]. 
After that, the degree to which a relation of necessity or sufficiency between a 
causal condition [or set of conditions] and an outcome is met within a given 
data set needs to be measured, also known as the ‘set theoretic consistency’ 
[Ragin, 2009, 2006]. Its measure mimics the notion of significance in 
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statistical models [Thiem, 2010]. Values of consistency range from ‘0’ to ‘1’, 
with ‘0’ being no consistency and ‘1’ relating to perfect consistency. One need 
also examine the ‘set-­‐ theoretic coverage’. This involves the assessment of 
how much of the outcome is covered by the configuration, which basically 
comprises an examination of the relative empirical weight that is carried by 
the set-­‐theoretic relation. [Ragin, 2008]. 
3.2. Model specifications, data and 
operationalization steps 
3.2.1. A general discussion on model specification 
In the literatures I have disused there are different empirical results because 
of either the difference in methodology or the explaining variables that are 
incorporated in the models. Theory has moved away from traditional conflict 
vs. compatibility arguments, because different aspects of the broader 
institutions-growth problem have been identified. For instance, researchers 
have separated economic democracy from political democracy. Factors like 
protection of property rights, business, credit and labor market regulations, 
which were previously attributed to political democracy, are now being 
treated as part of economic democracy [see Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu 
2006]. Many have found that democracy has affected growth indirectly 
rather than directly through human capital, income distribution, stability, 
inflation and so on.  
Doucouliagos et al [2006] has found in the meta analysis of the data in the 
development-democracy researches, that democracy has a zero effect but it 
has some positive and other times negative effect through other channels.  
Table summarizes some of the their findings. 
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Table 3.1: Direct and indirect –growth effects. 
 
My model will be based on Barro’s determinants of economy and 
incorporating the ideas I have discussed above hence the relation will be in 
addition to the direct one the other explanatory themselves are affected and 
hence they are a function of democracy. To state it mathematically: 
𝒅𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒑𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕= 𝒇[𝑯𝒖𝒎𝒂𝒏  𝒄𝒂𝒑𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒍,𝑫𝒆𝒎𝒐𝒄𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒚,𝑷𝒉𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒍  𝑪𝒂𝒑𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒍,𝑶𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓  𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒔] 
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Figure 3.1: A simplified picture of the causal relations between regime type, economic 
outcomes and other selected factors [by Carl Henrik Knutsen]  
3.2.2. Data 
I have collected data from different sources for the years 2000-2013 and the 
amount of cases [countries] that included is merely because of the availability 
of data rather than by choice. I have tried to make the data as representative 
as possible and as many as possible. However given that fsQCA’s limited 
capacity of computing and the large amount of combinations that might 
create, I limited the amount of conditions accordingly and as the a result 
missing causal conditions like regime history, geographic and demographic 
characteristics has been dropped.  In human capital I have included 
conditions like Barro-Lee data on year of schooling attainment, life 
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expectancy at birth and birth rate. As Economic freedom index incorporates 
rule of law, protection of property right and protection from corruption, it will 
be also taken as a proxy to these conditions. My outcome will be development 
expressed in the trend of Human Development Index. The reason I chose the 
index instead of other development measures like GDP per capita or PPP per 
capita is for the same reason of the debate in how much change in income or in 
production changes the wellbeing of a citizen. I have found also in the data 
countries like Equatorial Guinea and Chad have shown a tremendous growth 
because of the exploration of oil in their respective countries. The same can 
also be said about Angola. The lists of conditions and an out come I have 
chosen are [the colors code in whether it is physical capital, human capital or 
other factors]: 
Table 3.2: List of conditions and outcome 
Var. 
Name Type Source 
Outcome 
hdi Human Development index, trend 2000-2013 UNDP 
Conditions 
polity2 
Polity IV index [Higher 10- lower -20] Average 
2000-2013 INSCR 
fhi Freedom House PR index [Lower 7-higher1] Freedom House 
gdpcap Log of GDP per capita [2000] World Bank 
inv Investment ratio [%GDP] Average 2000-2013 World Bank 
inf  Inflation, GDP deflator [Average 2000-2013] World Bank 
open Trade [% GDP] [Average 2000-2013] World Bank 
govsize 
Government consumption [% GDP] [Average 
2000-2013] World Bank 
yrsch Barro-lee years of schooling [2000] Barro-Lee Data 
life Life expectancy at growth [2000] World Bank 
popn Population growth [Average 2000-2013] World Bank 
gini Gini coefficient [Average 2000-2013] World Bank 
urb Urbanization [% total] [Average 2000-2013] World Bank 
econfree 
Economic Freedom Index [Average 2000-
2013] Heritage Foundation 
stab Stability Index [Average 2000-2013] 
Worldwide Governance 
Indicators [WB] 
N.B. Averages are smoothed with 3-years moving average.      nEcon.  nHum.  nPol. 
3.2.3. Steps of analysis 
Preparatory Steps  
First I have Choose the desired outcome, which has to go with the aim of my 
study. The focus of my study is the presence of development rather than lack 
of it; I haven’t considered the negative outcome.  
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The next step was to choose the appropriate conditions that go with my model 
in determining development and treat the needed outcome and causal 
conditions as fuzzy sets, and determine membership functions [MFs] for all of 
them. I have used the assignment by transformation method to that.  
 
 
Fig. 3.2. Steps in fsQCA 
Then I evaluate these MFs for all available cases, the results being derived 
MFs.% Finally before going to the computational part, I created the causal 
combinations [rules] and viewed each as a possible corner in a dimensional 
vector space. 
Computational Steps  
The next step is to compute the MF of each of the candidate causal 
combinations in all of the available cases, and keep only the ones whose MF 
values are greater than 0.5, i.e., keep the causal combinations that are closer 
to corners and not the ones that are farther away from corners. After that I 
computed the consistencies of these surviving causal combinations, and keep 
only those causal combinations whose consistencies are  > 0.80 if one choses it 
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to be permissive or 0.9 to be more restrictive consistency threshold. 
Using Quine McCluskey [MQ] algorithm [which has been done through Ragin’s 
fs/QCA application], I obtained the complex and parsimonious solutions. After 
performing Counterfactual Analysis on the complex solutions based on my 
knowledge from the literatures about the democracy and the existence or 
absence of its channels, I constrained by the parsimonious solutions, to obtain 
the intermediate solutions. The complexity of an intermediate solution is 
supposed to be between complexities of the complex and parsimonious 
solutions, and, according to Ragin [2008], the intermediate solutions are the 
most useful ones for the analytical part.  
Summarization steps 
Finally, The computed coverage provides a measure of generality of a 
summary because it shows how many cases support the summary. It is an 
assessment of the degree to which a solution is supported by cases. In other 
words, coverage determines what percentage of cases covers a solution. Ragin 
[2008] mentions three kinds of coverage and Rihoux and Ragin [2009] define 
them as: [1] solution coverage, which is the proportion of cases that are 
covered by all of the terms; [2] raw coverage, which is the proportion of cases 
that are simultaneously covered by each term one at a time; and, [3] unique 
coverage, which is the proportion of cases that are uniquely covered by a 
specific term [no other terms cover those cases]. Each measure of coverage 
provides a different insight into the believable simplified intermediate 
solutions. In my analysis I will focus on raw coverage and solution coverage.  
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4. Results and Discussions 
In my analysis I will us the fsQCA methods to see if there are any causal 
relationships with economics growth either directly or in directly as it was 
suggested in many papers through economics activates like capital 
accumulation, human capital or other political factors like rule of law, 
stability, economic freedom. 
4.1. Notations 
The standard notation for qualitative comparative analysis is used. The 
presence of a condition stated by it variable name or label, while a negation of 
the variable name indicates the absence of a condition. The symbols used 
are: 
Table 4.1: Notations 
Operator Notations Used 
AND Multiplication [*] 
OR Addition [+] 
NOT Complement [∼) 
4.2. Descriptive analysis 
A simple glance an xy-plot between both Polity IV and FHI [Freedom House 
Index] shows that except a very few outlier most of the trend in Human 
Development Index is the same in most countries and majority of the already 
developed countries has reached the saturation stage that the growth rate and 
change in other components of the index and shows a little sign in showing 
change in the index. As a result, I found that the index helps to compare the 
developmental growth more in the developing countries than the developed.  
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Fig. 4.1: Human Development Index & Polity IV 
 
Among the very few outlier countries that have shown a higher trend in HDI 
in the last decade are two contrives governed by two closely allied parties that 
follow the same developmental state policies while Afghanistan has come out 
of destruction and a lot of western money has gone to its human development. 
Otherwise, many of the undemocratic countries exhibit different kinds of out 
come while majority of the developed counters converge to in a similar trend 
area. 
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Fig. 4.2 : Human Development Index & Freedom House PR index 
4.3. Calibrating Data Set 
As I have discussed in the previous chapter, principally, calibration can take 
three different routes. Direct methods draw on expert knowledge to provide 
membership scores. Indirect methods also use expert knowledge, but this has 
to be processed, often via some curve-fitting method, in order to translate it 
into fuzzy set membership scores.   
I have use in calibrating my data the assignment by transformation method, 
although it is frequently used it has some drawbacks. [see Thiem 2010]. It is 
based on some function that transforms existent data on an interval or ratio-
scaled base variable, such as GDP, power capabilities or public opinion, into 
fuzzy set membership scores while taking the substantive meaning of the 
values on their underlying scale with regards to the label of the fuzzy set into 
account.  
More precisely, I used the linear method [More methods given in the 
appendix]. The transformational rule the author establishes is a simple 
cumulative distribution of a uniform density function that normalizes the set. 
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In Stata, stdrank[varname] rank orders the variable and then standardizes 
this ranking to range from 0 to 1. The equation for this standardization is 
𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑑𝑣𝑎𝑟  –𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑑𝑣𝑎𝑟max  [𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑑𝑣𝑎𝑟]  –   𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑑𝑣𝑎𝑟  
 
4.4. Results based on economic activity 
I have included Log of GDP per capita [gdpcap], Investment ratio [inv], 
inflation [inf], Openness/Trade [trad] and government size/consumption ratio 
of GDP [govsize] in addition to democracy /Polity IV [polity2]. This will give a 
truth table with 26 or 64 rows. Before I proceed to the truth table, I will analyze 
the each conditions relation to the outcome and among each other.  
Table 4.2: Coincidence Matrix 
	   hdi	   polity2	   gdpcap	   inv	   inf	   open	   govsize	  
hdi	   1.000	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
polity2	   0.618	   1.000	   	   	   	   	   	  
gdpcap	   0.558	   0.854	   1.000	   	   	   	   	  
inv	   0.713	   0.720	   0.662	   1.000	   	   	   	  
inf	   0.769	   0.627	   0.598	   0.683	   1.000	   	   	  
open	   0.629	   0.734	   0.727	   0.710	   0.641	   1.000	   	  
govsize	   0.597	   0.809	   0.774	   0.667	   0.623	   0.721	   1.000	  
From the coincidence matrix above, the closest conditions to have some 
degree of overlap with the human development index set are investment ratio 
and inflations. Among the all the conditions the closest overlapping is between 
democracy and Log of GDP per capita [2000]. This reflects the reality that 
most of the countries that have a higher democracy index are also the one 
who have the highest per capita GDP.  Similarly there is an overlap between 
government size [government consumption as percent of GDP] and 
democracy index.  
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Table 4.3: Sufficiency and Necessity Matrix 
	   hdi	   polity2	   gdpcap	   inv	   inf	   open	   govsize	  
govsize	   0.601	   0.792	   0.744	   0.679	   0.609	   0.693	   1.000	  
open	   0.658	   0.710	   0.689	   0.724	   0.654	   1.000	   0.691	  
inf	   0.782	   0.620	   0.554	   0.686	   1.000	   0.632	   0.587	  
inv	   0.719	   0.699	   0.633	   1.000	   0.677	   0.691	   0.646	  
gdpcap	   0.553	   0.830	   1.000	   0.668	   0.577	   0.693	   0.747	  
polity2	   0.565	   1.000	   0.709	   0.630	   0.552	   0.611	   0.679	  
hdi	   1.000	   0.619	   0.517	   0.710	   0.762	   0.619	   0.564	  
 
Among the conditions the closest to be a sufficient condition is inflation rate 
[0.782] and likewise to be the necessary condition [0.762]. But since in both 
cases it doesn’t meet the threshold, we cannot conclude that it is either 
sufficient or necessary condition. However, higher GDP per capita rate is a 
sufficient condition for democracy [0.83] but not a necessary condition 
[0.709]  
4.4.1. Truth Table for the Presence of Outcome 
Truth tables are used to evaluate the argument of causal sufficiency, based 
on the strength of the subset relationship where membership scores in the 
causal conditions are consistently less than or equal to the scores on the 
outcome. FsQCA generates a truth table from the fuzzy set data, with its 
rows representing causal configurations, and the 1 and 0 values in the cells 
indicating the individual conditions for which the cases have strong fuzzy 
set membership scores. 
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Table 4.4: Truth Table  
polity2 gdpcap inv inf open govsize number hdi rawconsist priconsist symconsist 
0 0 1 0 0 1 1   0,987677991 0,940438986 0,940438986 
0 0 1 0 0 0 3   0,98527801 0,943515003 0,943515003 
0 0 1 1 1 0 5   0,983654022 0,924611986 0,93918997 
0 0 1 1 0 1 2   0,981360018 0,917675972 0,917675018 
1 0 1 1 1 0 2   0,980829 0,868098021 0,868098974 
0 0 0 1 0 0 9   0,978787005 0,927536011 0,935672998 
0 0 1 1 0 0 9   0,978116989 0,931258023 0,947229981 
1 0 1 0 0 0 3   0,97625798 0,881516993 0,892087996 
1 0 1 1 0 0 3   0,975650012 0,88499099 0,884989977 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1   0,975323975 0,878601015 0,878600001 
0 0 0 1 1 0 3   0,971844971 0,873637974 0,877462029 
1 0 1 0 1 1 3   0,971153975 0,788734019 0,794327021 
1 0 0 1 1 0 1   0,971060991 0,812501013 0,8125 
0 0 0 0 0 0 3   0,970772028 0,875831008 0,891647995 
0 0 0 0 1 0 3   0,969214022 0,840456009 0,857559025 
1 0 0 0 1 0 1   0,967401981 0,759257972 0,759258986 
0 0 1 0 1 1 1   0,966257989 0,793232024 0,793232977 
1 0 0 0 0 0 3   0,965242028 0,812183022 0,812183022 
0 1 1 1 0 0 1   0,964452028 0,714953005 0,714953005 
0 0 0 1 0 1 2   0,956945002 0,836893022 0,836893022 
1 0 1 1 1 1 4   0,954990983 0,743001997 0,77659601 
0 0 1 1 1 1 2   0,95412302 0,755813003 0,758017004 
0 1 0 0 0 1 1   0,941568017 0,300884992 0,311926007 
0 1 1 0 1 1 1   0,941021979 0,569378018 0,569378018 
1 0 0 1 0 1 3   0,937270999 0,720408022 0,720408976 
0 0 0 0 1 1 1   0,936774015 0,61867702 0,61867702 
1 0 0 1 1 1 2   0,935934007 0,639566004 0,644809008 
0 0 0 1 1 1 2   0,928950012 0,70222199 0,70222199 
1 1 0 1 0 0 4   0,922639012 0,434028 0,435539991 
0 1 1 0 1 0 2   0,922242999 0,462500989 0,476395011 
1 1 1 1 1 1 2   0,915270984 0,426667005 0,426667005 
1 1 1 0 1 0 3   0,912061989 0,296155989 0,296155006 
0 1 1 1 1 0 5   0,90820998 0,387832999 0,387832999 
0 1 0 1 1 0 1   0,905592024 0,289591998 0,289593011 
0 1 0 0 1 1 1   0,90426302 0,208093002 0,208093002 
1 1 0 1 1 1 1   0,897381008 0,252918005 0,252918005 
1 1 0 0 1 0 2   0,894105971 0,184615999 0,184615999 
1 1 0 0 0 0 2   0,892039001 0,205127999 0,207406998 
1 1 0 1 0 1 3   0,885833025 0,214286 0,222222999 
0 1 0 1 1 1 1   0,884616017 0,296153992 0,296153992 
1 1 1 0 1 1 11   0,766142011 0,132845998 0,134415999 
1 1 1 0 0 1 4   0,758094013 0,103334002 0,103334002 
1 1 0 0 1 1 5   0,739167988 0,064614996 0,064915001 
1 1 0 0 0 1 11   0,691039979 0,031787999 0,031787999 
1 1 1 1 1 0 0         
1 1 1 1 0 1 0         
1 1 1 1 0 0 0         
1 1 1 0 0 0 0         
1 1 0 1 1 0 0         
1 0 1 1 0 1 0         
1 0 1 0 1 0 0         
1 0 1 0 0 1 0         
1 0 0 0 1 1 0         
1 0 0 0 0 1 0         
0 1 1 1 1 1 0         
0 1 1 1 0 1 0         
0 1 1 0 0 1 0         
0 1 1 0 0 0 0         
0 1 0 1 0 1 0         
0 1 0 1 0 0 0         
0 1 0 0 1 0 0         
0 1 0 0 0 0 0         
0 0 1 0 1 0 0         
0 0 0 0 0 1 0         
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The truth table depicts the different corners of the vector space. The 1 and 0 
identifies for the causal condition the different corners of the vector space. 
The number of cases with greater than 0.5 in the vector space corner is also 
generated. The columns next to the number is the consistency measure 
assessing the degree to which membership in each corner is a subset of 
membership in the outcome of the cases. The next step is to cut the truth table 
to a chosen frequency and consistency threshold. For a small N the usual 
frequency threshold is 1 or 2. If one has a larger-N then the frequency 
threshold can also increase. The consistency threshold as I discussed in the 
previous chapter could be 7.5, 8 or 9 depending how strict one wants to be. In 
my study I have tried to compare both in 8 and 9 a frequency threshold of 2 or 
3. So every row that does not meet the criteria will be deleted and will have a 
reduced truth table2. 
Table 4.5: Reduced Truth Table  
polity2 gdpcap inv inf open govsize number hdi rawconsist priconsist symconsist 
0 0 1 0 0 0 3 1 0,98527801 0,943515003 0,943515003 
0 0 1 1 1 0 5 1 0,983654022 0,924611986 0,93918997 
0 0 1 1 0 1 2 1 0,981360018 0,917675972 0,917675018 
1 0 1 1 1 0 2 1 0,980829 0,868098021 0,868098974 
0 0 0 1 0 0 9 1 0,978787005 0,927536011 0,935672998 
0 0 1 1 0 0 9 1 0,978116989 0,931258023 0,947229981 
1 0 1 0 0 0 3 1 0,97625798 0,881516993 0,892087996 
1 0 1 1 0 0 3 1 0,975650012 0,88499099 0,884989977 
0 0 0 1 1 0 3 1 0,971844971 0,873637974 0,877462029 
1 0 1 0 1 1 3 1 0,971153975 0,788734019 0,794327021 
0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 0,970772028 0,875831008 0,891647995 
0 0 0 0 1 0 3 1 0,969214022 0,840456009 0,857559025 
1 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 0,965242028 0,812183022 0,812183022 
0 0 0 1 0 1 2 1 0,956945002 0,836893022 0,836893022 
1 0 1 1 1 1 4 1 0,954990983 0,743001997 0,77659601 
0 0 1 1 1 1 2 1 0,95412302 0,755813003 0,758017004 
1 0 0 1 0 1 3 1 0,937270999 0,720408022 0,720408976 
1 0 0 1 1 1 2 1 0,935934007 0,639566004 0,644809008 
0 0 0 1 1 1 2 1 0,928950012 0,70222199 0,70222199 
1 1 0 1 0 0 4 1 0,922639012 0,434028 0,435539991 
0 1 1 0 1 0 2 1 0,922242999 0,462500989 0,476395011 
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 0,915270984 0,426667005 0,426667005 
1 1 1 0 1 0 3 1 0,912061989 0,296155989 0,296155006 
0 1 1 1 1 0 5 1 0,90820998 0,387832999 0,387832999 
1 1 0 0 1 0 2 0 0,894105971 0,184615999 0,184615999 
1 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0,892039001 0,205127999 0,207406998 
1 1 0 1 0 1 3 0 0,885833025 0,214286 0,222222999 
1 1 1 0 1 1 11 0 0,766142011 0,132845998 0,134415999 
1 1 1 0 0 1 4 0 0,758094013 0,103334002 0,103334002 
1 1 0 0 1 1 5 0 0,739167988 0,064614996 0,064915001 
1 1 0 0 0 1 11 0 0,691039979 0,031787999 0,031787999 
To give an example, the first raw states that there are two cases where 
absence of democracy, small government with an economy higher ratio of its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  	  Truth Tables are not probablity distriubiton. 
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GDP is investment, closed trade activity with the outside and low inflation 
which causes of an outcome of development with consistency of 0.98. 
Using Quine McCluskey [MQ] algorithm, the analysis of the truth table is 
obtained. The analysis involves a series of minimizations: from the truth 
table to the complex solution using matched cases, from the complex 
solution to the intermediate solution using simplifying assumptions that 
involve easy counterfactuals [Ragin, 2008b], and from the intermediate 
solution to the parsimonious solution using simplifying assumptions with 
hard counterfactuals.  
My assumptions are based on theories and researches many have put in to the 
studies what effect they have one on another. For example, inflation has been 
debated that it might hinder or boost economic development in a developing 
country. When governments cannot collect enough revenue form the tax 
system, as many poor countries have a very big non-formal sector, then it 
might resort to inflation as an easy way of obtaining capital either for 
investment or benefit distribution.  Similarly, the convergence theory is 
behind my assumption that countries with initial GDP per capita tend to grow 
faster than countries with higher one. 
Hence, I assumed that a small government, an open economy, low initial GDP 
per capita, higher investment ratio/capital accumulation with or without both 
inflation and democracy can reach an outcome of development. 
4.4.2. Complex Solution 
The complex solution with a consistency cutoff of 0.8 has come up with eight 
solutions. Among these, there are democratic paths that arrive at the outcome 
with a consistency above 0.8. To put the results in verbally: 
A case [country] with  
Lower initial GDP per capita AND lower inflation AND less open AND a small 
government OR  
A non democracy with lower GDP per capita, less investment ratio and a small 
government OR  
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A democracy with higher GDP per capita, lower investment ratio, higher 
inflation rate and less open OR  
A non democracy with higher investment ratio, higher inflation, more open 
and smaller government OR  
A democracy with lower investment ratio, higher inflation rate, less open and 
big government OR  
A democracy with lower initial GDP per capita, high investment ratio, low infl 
ation and small government  
Can cause development with consistency of 0.86 and coverage 0.76. 
Table 4.6: Economic Activity Complex Solution 
********************** 
*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS* 
********************** 
        
Model: hdi = f [polity2, gdpcap, inv, inf, open, govsize] 
Rows: 21 
        
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey 
True: 1 
        
--- COMPLEX SOLUTION --- 
        
Frequency cutoff:  3.000000     
Consistency cutoff: 0.885833     
        
  
raw 
coverage 
---------- 
unique 
coverage 
---------- 
consistency 
---------- 
~gdpcap*~inf*~open*~govsize 0.389027 0.008983 0.951978 
~polity2*~gdpcap*~inv*~govsize 0.400497 0.062327 0.952976 
~gdpcap*inv*~open*~govsize 0.445688 0.060669 0.963262 
polity2*gdpcap*~inv*inf*~open 0.285793 0.007601 0.870370 
~polity2*inv*inf*open*~govsize 0.289386 0.025152 0.922061 
polity2*~inv*inf*~open*govsize 0.290354 0.007324 0.894804 
polity2*~gdpcap*inv*open*govsize 0.327114 0.050995 0.949840 
polity2*gdpcap*inv*~inf*open*~govsize 0.262300 0.015755 0.912062 
Solution coverage: 0.763543     
Solution consistency: 0.860056     
Likewise, with restricted consistency theory we get the same result of 
combination conditions that result in democracy.  
Countries like Argentina, Brazil, Turkey, Uruguay, South Africa, Dominican 
Republic, Malawi, Cape Verde, Timor Leste, Honduras, and Mauritius are 
some of the countries that showed an improvement in the Human 
Development Index yet follow the democratic path. 
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4.4.3. Parsimonious Solution 
The second solution is the least complex one. It allows the incorporation of 
contradictors or remainders into the solution. The three pathways to 
development obtained through this solution are: smaller government, low 
initial GDP per capita and higher inflation. However when we choose 
restrictive rather than permissive consistency threshold, i.e. 0.9 instead of 
0.8. Then we do not have inflation in the solution set and small government 
and low initial GDP are closer to the necessity condition. But in both cases, it 
has to be noted that government size is inconsistent with consistency of 0.676 
and hence an inconsistent sufficient condition rather than a consistent one. 
Table 4.7: Economic Activity Parsimonious Solution 
********************** 
*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS* 
********************** 
        
Model: hdi = f[polity2, gdpcap, inv, inf, open, govsize] 
Rows: 21 
        
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey  
True: 1-L 
        
--- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION --- 
        
Frequency cutoff: 3.000000     
Consistency cutoff: 0.885833     
        
 
raw 
coverage 
---------- 
unique 
coverage 
---------- 
consistency 
---------- 
~govsize 0.764372 0.028331 0.767129 
~gdpcap 0.878385 0.060254 0.878629 
inf 0.761885 0.025705 0.782541 
Solution coverage: 0.965727 
 
  
Solution consistency: 0.726026 
 
  
Meanwhile it is worthwhile to note that 87% of membership in the high HDI 
achievers is covered by being a member in having a lower initial GDP per 
capita and 76% with inflation.  
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4.4.4. Intermediate Solution 
The last and the most important according to Ragin [2008] is the 
intermediate one. It uses subset of the simplifying assumptions that are used 
in the most parsimonious solution. Hence, it takes into consideration the 
extensive knowledge of the researcher about the subject matter at hand.  
The assumptions of a small government, open economy, high investment ratio 
and lower initial GDP per capita are taken into consideration in this analysis. 
Table 4.8: Economic Activity Intermediate Solution 
********************** 
*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS* 
********************** 
    Model: hdi = f [govsize, open, inf, inv, gdpcap, polity2] 
Rows: 90       
        
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey 
True: 1 
0 Matrix: 0L 
Don't Care: - 
        
--- INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION --- 
        
frequency cutoff: 3.000000     
consistency cutoff: 0.885833     
        
Assumptions:       
~govsize [absent]     
open [present]     
inv [present]     
~gdpcap [absent]     
        
  
raw 
coverage 
---------- 
unique 
coverage 
---------- 
consistency 
---------- 
~govsize*~gdpcap 0.702736 0.193615 0.924377 
inf*polity2 0.518657 0.038834 0.859006 
~govsize*open*inf*inv 0.369265 0.006634 0.911634 
open*inv*~gdpcap*polity2 0.387507 0.011609 0.955366 
~govsize*open*inv*polity2 0.345080 0.011470 0.923106 
Solution coverage: 0.821863     
Solution consistency: 0.831748     
At 0.8 cutting threshold it generated solutions all above 0.8 consistency level 
and with 0.886  solution consistency. These are: 
Small Government size AND Low Initial GDP per capita    OR 
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High Inflation AND Democratic  OR 
Small Government AND Open AND High Investment AND High Inflation  OR 
Open AND High Investment AND Lower Initial GDP per Capita AND 
Democratic           OR 
Small Government AND Open AND high investment AND Democratic 
Can cause development with consistency of 0.83 and coverage 0.82. 
70% of membership in the outcome development [change in HDI] is covered in 
the membership of the single path small government size [government 
consumption ratio] AND low initial log GDP per capita [2000].  
Table 4.9: Economic Activity Intermediate Solution (Restrictive) 
********************** 
*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS* 
********************** 
        
Model: hdi = f[govsize, open, inf, inv, gdpcap, polity2] 
Rows: 72        
        
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey 
True: 1 
0 Matrix: 0L 
Don't Care: - 
        
--- INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION --- 
        
Frequency cutoff: 3.000000     
consistency cutoff: 0.908210     
        
Assumptions:       
~govsize [absent]     
open [present]     
inv [present]     
~gdpcap [absent]     
        
  
raw 
coverage 
---------- 
unique 
coverage 
---------- 
consistency 
---------- 
~govsize*~gdpcap 0.702736 0.193615 0.924377 
inf*~gdpcap*polity2 0.491708 0.016031 0.931414 
~govsize*inf*polity2 0.446656 0.013267 0.913252 
~govsize*open*inf*inv 0.369265 0.006633 0.911634 
open*inv*~gdpcap*polity2 0.387507 0.011609 0.955366 
~govsize*open*inv*polity2 0.345080 0.011470 0.923106 
Solution coverage: 0.812327     
Solution consistency: 0.847585     
As in the complex solution, democracy in combination of either open-
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economy, low initial GDP per capita or smaller government are two paths that 
can lead to improvement in human development.  
From the above results, we can observe that democracy in combination of 
other favorable economic activities is a path to more development, more than 
its absence. 
4.5. Results based on human capital 
In the human development causal analysis I used the conditions initial years 
of school attainment [yrssch], life expectancy [life] at birth, population 
growth [pop], income inequality [gini], in addition of course democracy 
[polity2].  
In the analysis, I will use the consistency threshold of 0.8 and frequency 
threshold of 2. 
4.5.1. Complex solution 
From the solution we can observe that democracy has two paths. First, 
Democracy AND higher school attainment AND Longer life expectancy AND 
high income inequality AND urbanized. The second solution gives Democracy 
AND higher year school attainment AND higher life expectancy AND less 
population growth AND less income inequality AND less urbanization. 
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Table 4.10: Human Capital Complex Solution 
********************** 
*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS* 
********************** 
        
Model: hdi = f [polity2, yrsch, life, popn, gini, urb] 
Rows: 16       
        
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey 
True: 1 
        
--- COMPLEX SOLUTION --- 
        
frequency cutoff: 2.000000     
consistency cutoff: 0.838445     
  
    
  
raw 
coverage 
---------- 
unique 
coverage 
---------- 
consistency 
---------- 
~yrsch*~life*popn*~urb 0.599637 0.131310 0.960116 
~polity2*~yrsch*~life*gini*~urb 0.454800 0.004949 0.959958 
~polity2*~yrsch*~life*popn*gini 0.453316 0.009733 0.957158 
polity2*yrsch*life*gini*urb 0.323656 0.005609 0.811079 
polity2*yrsch*popn*gini*urb 0.286869 0.001155 0.840909 
polity2*life*popn*gini*urb 0.291653 -0.000000 0.844720 
~polity2*yrsch*~life*~popn*~gini*~urb 0.239030 0.008083 0.973136 
polity2*yrsch*life*~popn*~gini*~urb 0.293467 0.017981 0.864431 
polity2*yrsch*~life*~popn*~gini*urb 0.283405 0.013362 0.946556 
polity2*~yrsch*~life*~popn*gini*urb 0.314418 0.003794 0.965063 
solution coverage: 0.824315     
solution consistency: 0.837860     
 
4.5.2. Parsimonious Solution 
Incorporating the logical contradictory cases in the Parsimonious, however, 
made the result inconsistent and hence no interpretation of the solution is 
needed. 
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Table 4.11: Human Capital Parsimonious Solution 
********************** 
*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS* 
********************** 
        
Model: hdi = f[polity2, yrsch, life, popn, gini, urb] 
Rows: 16       
        
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey 
True: 1-L 
        
--- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION --- 
        
frequency cutoff: 2.000000     
consistency cutoff: 0.838445     
        
  
raw 
coverage 
---------- 
unique 
coverage 
---------- 
consistency 
---------- 
~urb 0.831903 0.045035 0.859993 
~life 0.847740 0.041405 0.870427 
gini 0.697954 0.025569 0.728227 
solution coverage: 0.959914     
solution consistency: 0.728650     
4.5.3. Intermediate Solution 
In the intermediate solution I assumed that there is lower urbanization, lower 
income inequality, long life expectancy, longer school attainment and 
democracy. There is an argument that in a developing country high 
urbanization has both a negative and positive side effects. On one hand, the 
argument goes that with urbanization, there will be more roads and 
infrastructure to be built in fast urbanization places, and governments find it 
easier to deliver social services in a very central place than to a population 
scattered, therefore, better HDI. On another, evidence shows that in many 
cities in China and Brazil, urbanization has brought more income inequality 
and poverty to the slams that worsened life conditions. 
The solution combination for human capital related activates to reach the 
outcome is: 
Higher growth rate AND lower urbanization      OR 
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Lower urbanization AND longer school attainment AND democratic  OR 
Higher income inequalities AND longer school attainment AND democratic 
Two of the three paths involve democracy.  
Table 4.12: Human Capital Intermediate Solution 
********************** 
*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS* 
********************** 
        
Model: hdi = f[urb, gini, popn, life, yrsch, polity2] 
Rows: 142 
        
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey 
True: 1 
0 Matrix: 0L 
Don't Care: - 
        
--- INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION --- 
        
frequency cutoff: 2.000000     
consistency cutoff: 0.838445     
        
Assumptions:       
~gini [absent]     
life [present]     
yrsch [present]     
polity2 [present]     
        
  
raw 
coverage 
---------- 
unique 
coverage 
---------- 
consistency 
---------- 
~urb 0.831903 0.072583 0.859993 
popn*~life 0.695480 0.018806 0.920524 
~life*polity2 0.565325 0.012372 0.925466 
gini*popn 0.591884 0.003959 0.853676 
gini*polity2 0.533982 0.006104 0.783019 
solution coverage: 0.943418     
solution consistency: 0.771170     
    
4.6. Through other channels 
The other channels taken into consideration here are Economic Freedom 
[econfree], stability [sta] and democracy [polity2]. But unfortunately their 
solutions are inconsistent and hence no path can be derived from it. 
I found in my analysis there is a large degree of overlap between economic 
freedom and stability to HDI. In a fuzzy set coincidence should be closer to 
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zero than one, but in the case of freedom and stability it is closer to one. This 
creates limited diversity to explain consistently the outcome. 
Assuming that both stability and economic freedom need to be present for 
economic development, we will have an intermediate solution:  
Table 4.13: Other Channels Intermediate solution 
********************** 
*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS* 
********************** 
        
Model: hdi = f[stab, econfree, polity2] 
Rows: 8 
        
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey 
True: 1 
0 Matrix: 0L 
Don't Care: - 
        
--- INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION --- 
        
frequency cutoff: 4.000000     
consistency cutoff: 0.874006     
        
Assumptions:       
stab [present]     
econfree [present]     
polity2 [present]     
        
  
raw 
coverage 
---------- 
unique 
coverage 
---------- 
consistency 
---------- 
~polity2 0.651470 0.035033 0.807628 
~econfree 0.829552 0.213114 0.782130 
solution coverage: 0.864585     
solution consistency: 0.728753     
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5. Conclusions 
There is no general consensus in the empirical literature that the causality 
holds and that there is a causal effect of democracy on development. In my 
thesis, I argue that, there are paths for democracy leading to development in 
combination with other determinants of development; hence, it has a causality 
effect.  
To that effect, I have tried to review the relevant literature and understand 
the findings. The differences in the literature I found include differences in 
definitions, direct and indirect effects, data set used and methodology. Most of 
the negative results emanates from the modernization theory that subscribes 
democracy should come first before development in order for democracy to 
sustain. 
In my analysis I used fsQCA, a method usually used in the social sciences, to 
determine a causality relationship. I have provided an interpretation of my 
results and I found that there are many paths to arrive at development, using 
Human Development Index as proxy, through democracy. In interpreting and 
choosing my results, I have used the different notions in the literature review, 
more precisely, the many determinant of democracy and development both 
directly and indirectly. 
One limitation that I faced in my research hence it could be an opening for 
further research is that how to use information in a panel data without loosing 
relevant information in averaging or aggregating such data. Although it was 
not possible to do so within the scope of this thesis due to its limited length, 
there are new methods and suggestions in how to include panel data in fsQCA 
analysis.  Another, the software capacity and analysis tools have also their 
limit.   
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Appendices  
Data Used 
countryname hdi polity2 fhi gdpcap inv inf 
AFGHANISTAN 2,461 -7,000 5,769  18,208 8,707 
ANGOLA 2,605 -2,143 6,000 6,486 13,251 65,142 
ALBANIA 0,686 8,000 3,077 7,085 27,998 3,062 
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 0,282 -8,000 6,000 10,448 22,606 7,266 
ARGENTINA 0,551 8,000 2,077 8,949 17,847 15,525 
ARMENIA 0,922 5,000 4,923 6,432 28,296 3,614 
AUSTRALIA 0,294 10,000 1,000 9,984 27,076 3,469 
AUSTRIA 0,413 10,000 1,000 10,107 24,051 1,713 
AZERBAIJAN 1,208 -7,000 6,000 6,485 28,760 9,178 
BURUNDI 2,289 4,500 4,846 4,871 18,749 13,914 
BELGIUM 0,072 9,000 1,000 10,050 23,207 2,017 
BENIN 1,525 6,571 2,154 5,827 20,699 3,019 
BANGLADESH 1,617 3,857 3,615 5,875 25,447 6,710 
BULGARIA 0,661 8,929 1,462 7,399 25,446 4,973 
BAHRAIN 0,304 -7,571 5,538 9,515 24,357 7,202 
BAHAMAS 0,231  1,000 9,964 25,903 1,431 
BELIZE 0,626  1,000 8,157 20,134 1,566 
BOLIVIA 0,634 7,857 2,615 6,896 16,003 6,813 
BRAZIL 0,665 8,000 2,154 8,215 17,898 7,855 
BARBADOS 0,313  1,000 9,365 16,770 1,703 
BRUNEI 0,271  6,154 9,803 14,371 6,342 
BOTSWANA 1,541 8,000 2,308 8,101 32,490 7,782 
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 0,614 0,357 5,231 5,527 10,831 1,363 
CANADA 0,305 10,000 1,000 10,087 22,516 2,394 
SWITZERLAND 0,270 10,000 1,000 10,540 24,351 0,770 
CHILE 0,678 9,571 1,231 8,543 22,567 5,456 
CHINA 1,516 -7,000 7,000 6,856 43,375 3,919 
CÔTE D IVOIRE 1,075 1,429 6,000 6,470 12,544 3,476 
CAMEROON 1,178 -4,000 6,077 6,368 18,691 2,578 
CONGO, DEM. R. 1,639 3,429 5,923 6,008 14,412 208,205 
CONGO 0,917 -4,214 5,692 6,937 23,442 8,276 
COLOMBIA 0,633 7,000 3,385 7,825 20,889 7,212 
COSTA RICA 0,604 10,000 1,000 8,308 22,030 8,448 
CAPE VERDE 0,811 9,857 1,000 7,106 45,530 1,399 
CUBA 0,726 -7,000 7,000 7,917 10,982 2,451 
CYPRUS 0,426 10,000 1,000 9,505 19,474 2,511 
CZECH REP. 0,515 9,429 1,000 8,699 29,035 1,767 
GERMANY 0,505 10,000 1,000 10,073 20,085 1,081 
DOMINICA 0,288  1,000 8,481 17,101 3,148 
DENMARK 0,366 10,000 1,000 10,333 21,371 2,261 
DOMINICAN REP. 0,635 8,000 2,077 7,927 22,258 10,912 
ALGERIA 0,946 0,571 6,000 7,454 34,870 8,866 
ECUADOR 0,589 5,571 3,000 7,288 24,195 7,552 
EGYPT 0,717 -4,071 5,923 7,320 18,238 8,654 
SPAIN 0,391 10,000 1,000 9,602 26,288 2,451 
ESTONIA 0,614 9,000 1,000 8,311 30,788 5,062 
ETHIOPIA 3,350 -1,571 5,308 4,827 31,067 12,117 
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FINLAND 0,345 10,000 1,000 10,096 23,130 1,731 
FIJI 0,549 0,071 5,231 7,638 20,638 2,952 
FRANCE 0,327 9,000 1,000 10,020 22,392 1,593 
GABON 0,496 -1,500 5,615 8,327 26,282 6,919 
UNITED KINGDOM 0,249 10,000 1,000 10,177 17,883 2,369 
GHANA 1,259 7,143 1,385 5,579 24,840 24,126 
GAMBIA 1,079 -5,000 5,154 6,457 21,214 5,583 
EQUATORIAL GUINEA 1,206 -5,000 6,923 7,610 74,781 13,495 
GREECE 0,510 10,000 1,231 9,389 21,625 2,091 
GUATEMALA 1,007 8,000 3,385 7,451 17,742 4,939 
GUYANA 0,871 6,000 2,077 6,864 23,756 11,388 
HONDURAS 0,784 7,000 3,308 7,038 26,969 7,798 
CROATIA 0,637 8,643 1,692 8,501 24,833 3,200 
HAITI 0,662 1,071 5,077 6,057 28,052 11,637 
HUNGARY 0,432 10,000 1,000 8,437 23,748 5,053 
INDONESIA 0,898 7,429 2,385 6,672 27,404 10,417 
INDIA 1,487 9,000 2,000 6,125 32,681 5,755 
IRELAND 0,323 10,000 1,000 10,170 22,690 2,037 
IRAN 1,071 -3,786 6,000 7,337 33,956 17,173 
IRAQ 0,452 -2,143 6,154  19,429 12,683 
ICELAND 0,319  1,000 10,368 22,109 5,025 
ISRAEL 0,344 10,000 1,000 9,948 19,752 1,898 
ITALY 0,427 10,000 1,077 9,906 20,615 2,107 
JAMAICA 0,491 9,000 2,000 8,155 24,437 9,284 
JORDAN 0,426 -2,500 5,308 7,475 26,081 5,133 
JAPAN 0,284 10,000 1,000 10,527 22,105 -1,259 
KAZAKHSTAN 0,842 -5,714 6,000 7,114 27,014 13,817 
KENYA 1,249 6,429 4,000 6,007 18,894 8,087 
KYRGYZSTAN 0,522 1,714 5,385 5,633 23,395 10,460 
CAMBODIA 1,754 2,000 6,000 5,700 18,413 3,392 
KUWAIT 0,091 -7,000 4,154 9,893 15,994 8,550 
LAO PDR 1,435 -7,000 7,000 5,772 24,733 8,801 
LIBERIA 1,517 4,071 4,077 5,209 17,394 6,690 
LIBYA 0,402 -5,500 6,538 8,787 17,458 15,356 
SRI LANKA 0,766 4,786 3,846 6,751 26,218 9,674 
LESOTHO 0,718 7,571 2,462 6,029 30,214 7,072 
LITHUANIA 0,746 10,000 1,077 8,092 21,371 3,079 
LUXEMBOURG 0,130 10,000 1,000 10,796 19,087 2,806 
LATVIA 0,821 8,000 1,462 8,104 29,408 5,880 
MOROCCO 1,233 -5,571 5,000 7,151 31,356 1,393 
MOLDOVA 0,799 8,571 2,923 5,869 26,794 10,916 
MADAGASCAR 0,728 5,143 3,923 5,506 22,136 9,375 
MALDIVES 1,187  5,154 7,736 25,568 4,531 
MEXICO 0,605 8,000 2,308 8,792 22,386 5,519 
MALI 2,133 6,214 2,615 5,464 22,262 4,253 
MALTA 0,566  1,000 9,247 17,007 3,010 
MYANMAR 1,690 -6,214 6,846  11,447 18,568 
MONGOLIA 1,427 10,000 1,846 6,162 40,071 13,530 
MOZAMBIQUE 2,486 4,929 3,308 5,463 20,592 8,527 
MAURITANIA 0,909 -3,500 5,615 5,990 31,742 8,149 
MAURITIUS 0,903 10,000 1,000 8,259 24,298 4,885 
MALAWI 1,501 5,643 3,538 5,037 20,458 18,526 
MALAYSIA 0,584 4,286 4,308 8,295 23,444 3,732 
NAMIBIA 0,887 6,000 2,000 7,630 22,572 7,832 
NIGER 1,952 4,857 3,462 5,098 25,110 3,510 
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NICARAGUA 0,788 8,500 3,538 6,909 24,426 8,292 
NETHERLANDS 0,354 10,000 1,000 10,164 21,017 1,963 
NORWAY 0,277 10,000 1,000 10,531 22,289 4,952 
NEPAL 1,420 2,571 4,308 5,468 28,895 7,755 
NEW ZEALAND 0,318 10,000 1,000 9,509 21,738 2,573 
PAKISTAN 1,302 0,000 5,231 6,243 16,976 11,326 
PANAMA 0,593 9,000 1,077 8,244 21,698 3,064 
PERU 0,602 8,714 2,000 7,580 21,428 3,219 
PHILIPPINES 0,488 8,000 2,769 6,950 20,079 4,318 
NORTH KOREA 0,650 -10,000 7,000    
PALAU 0,339  1,000 9,028  5,052 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA 1,167 4,143 3,077 6,484 21,192 5,726 
POLAND 0,479 9,857 1,000 8,409 21,159 3,010 
PORTUGAL 0,407 10,000 1,000 9,350 22,626 2,273 
PARAGUAY 0,608 7,857 3,231 7,334 16,009 8,122 
QATAR 0,366 -10,000 6,000 10,306 34,199 10,383 
ROMANIA 0,817 8,714 2,077 7,416 24,923 15,502 
RUSSIA 0,635 5,000 5,692 7,480 21,925 15,389 
RWANDA 3,350 -3,429 6,231 5,331 19,129 7,902 
SAUDI ARABIA 0,899 -10,000 7,000 9,144 23,979 6,266 
SUDAN 1,586 -4,000 7,000 5,876 25,184 15,966 
SENEGAL 1,252 7,500 2,385 6,162 24,098 2,340 
SINGAPORE 0,922 -2,000 4,769 10,077 26,313 1,215 
SOLOMON ISLANDS 0,254 6,154 3,692 6,961 9,673 6,860 
SIERRA LEONE 1,787 5,429 3,462 5,034 15,292 15,160 
EL SALVADOR 0,670 7,357 2,000 7,698 15,568 2,920 
SERBIA 0,340 8,000 2,429 6,769 22,388 20,570 
SAO TOME & PRINCIPE 0,925  1,769 6,310 45,588 13,395 
SLOVENIA 0,481 10,000 1,000 9,233 26,081 3,447 
SLOVAKIA 0,515 9,571 1,000 8,595 26,494 2,975 
SWEDEN 0,077 10,000 1,000 10,285 22,640 1,661 
SWAZILAND 0,483 -9,000 6,769 7,268 14,071 8,013 
SEYCHELLES 0,143  3,000 8,933 29,846 10,378 
SYRIA 0,649 -7,286 7,000 7,074 20,487 6,951 
CHAD 1,661 -2,000 6,462 5,117 31,257 6,372 
TOGO 0,737 -2,714 5,308 5,584 16,338 3,294 
THAILAND 0,825 5,786 3,692 7,585 26,470 2,762 
TAJIKISTAN 1,072 -2,571 6,000 4,935 16,830 18,316 
TIMOR LESTE 2,248 6,667 3,385 6,066 34,077 4,356 
TONGA 0,370  4,308 7,563 24,842 5,529 
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO 0,728 10,000 2,385 8,769 20,552 5,724 
TUNISIA 0,772 -1,929 5,538 7,718 24,211 3,557 
TURKEY 1,160 7,429 3,154 8,347 19,580 17,311 
TANZANIA 2,042 -1,000 3,692 5,731 25,263 10,647 
UGANDA 1,631 -2,071 5,308 5,542 23,470 8,875 
UKRAINE 0,728 6,286 3,615 6,455 21,382 14,489 
URUGUAY 0,501 10,000 1,000 8,835 18,694 7,606 
UNITED STATES 0,262 10,000 1,000 10,504 21,181 2,077 
VENEZUELA 0,926 3,143 3,923 8,476 24,185 27,740 
VIETNAM 0,960 -7,000 7,000 6,072 32,373 10,046 
YEMEN 1,219 -1,286 5,462 6,310 18,985 11,922 
SOUTH AFRICA 0,357 9,000 1,538 8,039 19,004 7,312 
ZAMBIA 2,193 5,571 3,615 5,876 29,878 15,034 
ZIMBABWE 1,075 -1,929 6,308 6,282 10,331 8,099 
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countryname trad govsiz yr_sch life pop gini 
AFGHANISTAN 81,134 11,536 2,857 54,849 3,031 27,820 
ANGOLA 122,185 22,052  45,205 3,309 50,650 
ALBANIA 75,690 10,045 9,479 74,272 -0,503 30,595 
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 134,089 7,511 8,432 74,406 8,375  
ARGENTINA 33,282 12,514 8,729 73,746 0,905 48,868 
ARMENIA 69,435 11,503 10,435 71,277 -0,276 32,648 
AUSTRALIA 41,162 17,552 11,074 79,234 1,433 34,075 
AUSTRIA 95,051 19,338 8,974 78,127 0,423 29,505 
AZERBAIJAN 90,694 10,100  66,758 1,180 23,095 
BURUNDI 38,710 22,391 2,559 48,208 3,143 33,270 
BELGIUM 147,330 22,690 10,289 77,722 0,639 33,140 
BENIN 47,430 12,012 3,115 55,188 3,045 41,075 
BANGLADESH 39,569 5,135 4,479 65,320 1,331 32,933 
BULGARIA 105,529 17,044 9,275 71,663 -0,786 32,415 
BAHRAIN 132,981 14,556 7,480 74,589 5,226  
BAHAMAS 92,799 12,907  72,254 1,797  
BELIZE 120,521 14,666 10,084 70,539 2,562  
BOLIVIA 67,420 14,738 8,289 62,955 1,776 54,713 
BRAZIL 25,611 20,348 6,519 70,257 1,090 55,877 
BARBADOS 91,619 16,775 8,814 73,019 0,478  
BRUNEI 105,345 21,644 8,219 76,031 1,805  
BOTSWANA 92,793 20,321 8,816 50,490 1,132 62,595 
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 35,762 10,119 3,289 43,692 1,837 49,935 
CANADA 68,279 20,376 10,948 79,237 1,015 33,778 
SWITZERLAND 107,603 10,959 9,781 79,680 0,886 32,697 
CHILE 68,335 11,481 9,069 76,759 1,024 52,918 
CHINA 56,264 14,221 6,926 72,141 0,573 41,354 
CÔTE D IVOIRE 87,419 8,046 3,868 46,454 1,795 42,330 
CAMEROON 43,721 10,577 5,462 51,936 2,577 41,425 
CONGO, DEM. R. 59,256 8,091 3,367 46,356 2,758 44,430 
CONGO 136,660 13,789 5,672 52,302 2,708 43,745 
COLOMBIA 35,927 16,272 6,902 70,987 1,488 56,330 
COSTA RICA 90,432 15,285 7,705 77,734 1,697 49,252 
CAPE VERDE 94,827 17,896  69,591 0,993 47,170 
CUBA 34,497 34,713 8,909 76,669 0,105  
CYPRUS 99,206 18,214 9,937 77,972 1,496  
CZECH REP. 120,253 20,060 12,694 74,968 0,158 26,530 
GERMANY 73,315 18,666 10,062 77,927 -0,127 30,850 
DOMINICA 86,043 16,435   0,212  
DENMARK 92,376 25,515 10,769 76,593 0,383 25,380 
DOMINICAN REP. 66,767 8,683 6,981 70,633 1,420 49,638 
ALGERIA 67,143 15,270 5,670 68,930 1,614  
ECUADOR 57,386 11,531 7,096 73,357 1,768 51,734 
EGYPT 51,420 11,771 6,027 68,591 1,654 31,883 
SPAIN 55,659 18,247 8,926 78,966 1,107 34,120 
ESTONIA 139,715 18,235 11,408 70,417 -0,332 33,597 
ETHIOPIA 43,188 14,357  52,241 2,736 31,715 
FINLAND 76,135 22,107 9,089 77,466 0,369 27,855 
FIJI 124,609 16,585 9,764 67,606 0,628 44,820 
FRANCE 54,402 22,977 9,745 79,056 0,616 31,465 
GABON 91,466 9,619 7,019 59,688 2,392 42,190 
UNITED KINGDOM 56,636 20,087 9,916 77,741 0,631 37,913 
GHANA 89,348 12,795 6,436 56,988 2,449 42,760 
GAMBIA 66,808 8,953 2,638 55,171 3,130 47,280 
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EQUATORIAL GUINEA 211,336 4,857  47,764 2,932  
GREECE 54,863 19,871 8,892 77,888 0,095 34,195 
GUATEMALA 63,391 9,377 4,096 67,741 2,473 53,975 
GUYANA 201,050 19,878 8,130 63,485 0,543  
HONDURAS 122,794 15,902 5,651 70,484 2,015 56,465 
CROATIA 82,097 19,345 9,714 72,808 -0,279 31,218 
HAITI 60,527 8,177 4,326 57,423 1,440 59,210 
HUNGARY 145,447 21,503 11,201 71,246 -0,244 28,472 
INDONESIA 56,547 8,312 5,152 67,251 1,381 34,314 
INDIA 42,092 11,308 5,032 62,162 1,430 33,627 
IRELAND 163,599 16,905 10,664 76,537 1,446 32,700 
IRAN 50,613 12,829 7,310 69,608 1,267 38,280 
IRAQ 98,054 18,108 5,902 70,830 2,669 29,070 
ICELAND 83,586 23,859 9,671 79,654 1,104 27,810 
ISRAEL 72,912 23,790 11,341 78,954 1,961 41,255 
ITALY 51,358 19,267 8,784 79,778 0,405 36,058 
JAMAICA 90,954 14,912 9,142 70,471 0,379 54,340 
JORDAN 125,107 21,690 8,360 71,780 2,302 34,770 
JAPAN 27,674 18,836 10,942 81,076 0,040 32,110 
KAZAKHSTAN 87,244 11,269 10,542 65,517 0,943 30,259 
KENYA 55,783 15,541 5,687 52,840 2,680 47,680 
KYRGYZSTAN 114,886 18,159 9,396 68,559 1,192 33,799 
CAMBODIA 125,636 5,288 3,495 61,887 1,682 35,328 
KUWAIT 91,503 18,057 6,094 73,355 4,404  
LAO PDR 76,598 8,903 4,251 61,644 1,751 34,717 
LIBERIA 110,945 11,287 3,491 52,409 3,205 38,160 
LIBYA 84,670 14,436 6,787 71,966 1,407  
SRI LANKA 68,158 13,768 10,241 71,157 0,758 39,240 
LESOTHO 174,191 36,459 6,212 47,183 0,858 52,855 
LITHUANIA 119,536 19,950 9,494 72,020 -1,252 33,945 
LUXEMBOURG 310,477 16,074 9,553 77,873 1,663  
LATVIA 101,657 18,881 9,339 70,315 -1,229 35,462 
MOROCCO 72,694 18,394 3,822 68,139 1,081 40,755 
MOLDOVA 130,241 18,679 9,209 66,898 -0,175 34,484 
MADAGASCAR 69,725 9,336  58,473 2,906 42,327 
MALDIVES 163,395 18,187 4,257 69,462 1,819 37,370 
MEXICO 56,632 11,247 7,663 74,265 1,276 48,791 
MALI 66,649 11,512 1,233 49,055 3,055 37,340 
MALTA 169,674 20,007 9,784 78,200 0,613  
MYANMAR 0,670  3,690 62,024 0,754  
MONGOLIA 121,161 14,001 7,884 62,924 1,271 34,680 
MOZAMBIQUE 70,614 14,335 1,080 47,425 2,661 46,385 
MAURITANIA 101,077 21,096 3,545 59,673 2,802 40,253 
MAURITIUS 120,285 13,859 6,702 71,663 0,490 35,790 
MALAWI 72,834 16,616 3,478 46,034 2,828 43,045 
MALAYSIA 186,795 12,273 9,086 72,851 1,863 43,373 
NAMIBIA 98,967 22,907 5,717 55,121 1,538 62,610 
NIGER 53,308 14,542 1,380 50,706 3,718 37,323 
NICARAGUA 77,027 7,899 5,507 69,647 1,367 43,087 
NETHERLANDS 131,157 23,878 10,806 77,988 0,435 30,107 
NORWAY 71,157 20,829 11,023 78,634 0,927 27,763 
NEPAL 46,741 9,320 2,973 62,043 1,450 38,325 
NEW ZEALAND 61,060 18,535 11,761 78,637 1,050  
PAKISTAN 32,538 9,433 3,871 63,886 1,850 30,792 
PANAMA 141,622 12,385 8,736 75,117 1,823 54,000 
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PERU 45,910 11,087 8,850 70,505 1,219 48,955 
PHILIPPINES 85,396 10,016 7,869 66,797 1,843 44,124 
NORTH KOREA    64,983 0,678  
PALAU 118,342   70,494 0,733  
PAPUA NEW GUINEA 121,291 15,743 3,477 58,799 2,388  
POLAND 75,706 18,478 10,257 73,749 -0,027 33,665 
PORTUGAL 67,447 19,953 7,432 76,315 0,165  
PARAGUAY 97,418 10,103 6,231 70,077 1,863 52,546 
QATAR 91,333 14,615 6,605 76,820 9,518  
ROMANIA 76,924 7,640 10,042 71,163 -0,839 29,247 
RUSSIA 55,333 17,855 10,905 65,341 -0,183 38,440 
RWANDA 37,540 14,534 3,233 47,643 2,894 51,807 
SAUDI ARABIA 80,371 22,348 7,080 72,615 2,749  
SUDAN 35,341 11,514 2,817 57,978 2,412 35,290 
SENEGAL 68,508 14,042 1,918 57,774 2,749 40,250 
SINGAPORE 384,659 10,490 9,152 77,951 2,217  
SOLOMON ISLANDS 93,559 28,169  62,837 2,395  
SIERRA LEONE 54,133 11,062 2,785 38,112 2,951 37,410 
EL SALVADOR 70,405 10,286 6,587 69,559 0,479 47,471 
SERBIA 72,610 20,473 8,998 71,583 -0,366 30,842 
SAO TOME & PRINCIPE 68,761 19,247  63,293 2,427 42,345 
SLOVENIA 122,066 19,124 11,351 75,412 0,272 26,720 
SLOVAKIA 149,519 18,622 11,203 73,051 0,023 27,629 
SWEDEN 84,446 25,156 11,377 79,644 0,575 26,780 
SWAZILAND 153,656 15,818 4,438 48,664 1,255 52,440 
SEYCHELLES 182,702 34,696   0,739 65,770 
SYRIA 71,978 12,960 4,579 73,330 2,546 35,780 
CHAD 82,807 6,529  46,687 3,369 41,540 
TOGO 91,998 10,126 4,751 53,545 2,594 44,095 
THAILAND 136,938 12,204 5,655 70,917 0,599 41,410 
TAJIKISTAN 106,455 10,527 10,628 63,772 2,126 32,320 
TIMOR LESTE 136,349 102,609  59,481 2,358 30,410 
TONGA 71,813 17,681 9,367 70,760 0,554  
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO 99,858 11,905 9,515 68,598 0,419  
TUNISIA 96,132 17,044 5,897 72,600 1,006 38,110 
TURKEY 50,498 13,112 6,103 69,998 1,325 40,077 
TANZANIA 47,024 15,451 4,733 49,972 2,821 36,673 
UGANDA 43,803 12,648 4,325 48,109 3,351 44,310 
UKRAINE 106,004 19,000 10,454 67,860 -0,628 28,086 
URUGUAY 53,048 12,363 8,073 74,660 0,209 45,684 
UNITED STATES 26,533 15,481 12,638 76,637 0,891 40,870 
VENEZUELA 50,465 12,326 6,714 72,444 1,706 47,678 
VIETNAM 135,840 5,803 5,645 73,631 1,129 36,758 
YEMEN 75,163 13,560 2,340 60,458 2,568 35,910 
SOUTH AFRICA 58,204 19,154 7,680 55,837 1,527 63,333 
ZAMBIA 65,721 2,804 6,160 41,783 2,789 51,235 
ZIMBABWE 83,890 14,819 7,003 43,922 0,952  
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countryname urb lang rel econfree rol stab 
AFGHANISTAN 23,477 0,614 0,272  -1,816 -1,357 
ANGOLA 37,382 0,787 0,628  -1,389 0,789 
ALBANIA 48,396 0,040 0,472 5,458 -0,713  
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 82,745 0,487 0,331 7,565 0,520 0,396 
ARGENTINA 90,333 0,062 0,224 7,195 -0,657  
ARMENIA 63,938 0,129 0,458  -0,406 0,894 
AUSTRALIA 88,206 0,335 0,821 7,982 1,753 -0,651 
AUSTRIA 65,834 0,152 0,415 7,415 1,855 0,982 
AZERBAIJAN 52,705 0,205 0,490  -0,827 -0,303 
BURUNDI 9,786 0,298 0,516 5,142 -1,232 -0,528 
BELGIUM 97,465 0,541 0,213 7,441 1,325 0,459 
BENIN 40,594 0,791 0,554 5,658 -0,566 0,848 
BANGLADESH 27,975 0,092 0,209 5,449 -0,871 0,091 
BULGARIA 71,092 0,303 0,597 5,337 -0,137 -1,613 
BAHRAIN 88,464 0,434 0,553 7,289 0,510 0,943 
BAHAMAS 82,363 0,185 0,681 6,381 1,033 -1,246 
BELIZE 45,924 0,630 0,581 6,174 -0,228 0,803 
BOLIVIA 64,834 0,224 0,208 6,690 -0,833 0,899 
BRAZIL 83,257 0,047 0,605 5,597 -0,274 0,227 
BARBADOS 32,692 0,093 0,693 5,551 1,204 0,879 
BRUNEI 74,032 0,344 0,440  0,557 -0,070 
BOTSWANA 55,367 0,411 0,599 6,962 0,618 1,177 
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 38,379 0,833 0,792 4,868 -1,457 0,417 
CANADA 80,434 0,577 0,696 8,103 1,741 1,082 
SWITZERLAND 73,534 0,544 0,608 8,210 1,836 0,723 
CHILE 87,737 0,187 0,384 7,492 1,287 -1,643 
CHINA 44,513 0,133 0,664 5,396 -0,431 -0,455 
CÔTE D IVOIRE 48,027 0,784 0,755 5,745 -1,321 0,248 
CAMEROON 49,424 0,890 0,734 5,419 -1,126 0,769 
CONGO, DEM. R. 38,239 0,870 0,702 3,671 -1,651  
CONGO 61,647 0,687 0,664 4,916 -1,218 0,582 
COLOMBIA 74,006 0,019 0,148 5,527 -0,557 -2,140 
COSTA RICA 67,350 0,049 0,241 7,252 0,494 0,534 
CAPE VERDE 58,891  0,077  0,425 -1,561 
CUBA 76,228  0,506  -0,810 0,860 
CYPRUS 68,024 0,396 0,396 6,144 1,038 1,056 
CZECH REP. 73,501 0,323 0,659 6,845 0,870 -0,107 
GERMANY 73,769 0,164 0,657 7,608 1,650 0,331 
DOMINICA 67,055  0,463  0,659 -0,597 
DENMARK 86,145 0,105 0,233 7,612 1,915 0,879 
DOMINICAN REP. 69,284 0,039 0,312 6,775 -0,668 -0,737 
ALGERIA 64,877 0,443 0,009 4,219 -0,721 1,177 
ECUADOR 61,966 0,131 0,142 5,246 -0,991 0,013 
EGYPT 42,983 0,024 0,198 6,657 -0,145 -0,121 
SPAIN 77,627 0,413 0,451 7,310 1,153  
ESTONIA 68,542 0,494 0,498 7,025 0,999 0,159 
ETHIOPIA 16,324 0,807 0,625  -0,741 1,314 
FINLAND 83,094 0,141 0,253 7,632 1,943 0,260 
FIJI 50,454 0,548 0,568 6,015 -0,490 0,480 
FRANCE 77,485 0,122 0,403 6,970 1,412 0,310 
GABON 83,883 0,782 0,667 5,269 -0,481 -0,768 
UNITED KINGDOM 80,328 0,053 0,694 8,350 1,671 0,773 
GHANA 48,332 0,673 0,799 5,623 -0,034  
GAMBIA 53,404 0,808 0,097  -0,333 0,819 
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EQUATORIAL GUINEA 39,038 0,322 0,120  -1,315 0,619 
GREECE 74,997 0,030 0,153 6,818 0,705 0,501 
GUATEMALA 47,841 0,459 0,375 6,336 -1,068 -0,645 
GUYANA 28,361 0,069 0,788 6,055 -0,573 -0,460 
HONDURAS 49,470 0,055 0,236 6,300 -0,946 0,746 
CROATIA 56,813 0,076 0,445 5,464 0,075 0,476 
HAITI 46,288  0,470 6,313 -1,527 0,892 
HUNGARY 67,206 0,030 0,524 6,562 0,813 -1,052 
INDONESIA 47,134 0,768 0,234 5,948 -0,712 -2,220 
INDIA 29,763 0,807 0,326 6,110 0,045 -1,083 
IRELAND 60,889 0,031 0,155 8,133 1,655 0,528 
IRAN 68,385 0,746 0,115 5,076 -0,814 0,993 
IRAQ 68,854 0,369 0,484  -1,658 -1,347 
ICELAND 93,201 0,082 0,191 7,674 1,813 -1,100 
ISRAEL 91,609 0,552 0,347 6,735 0,902 -0,260 
ITALY 67,921 0,115 0,303 7,057 0,483 0,951 
JAMAICA 53,088 0,110 0,616 6,991 -0,448  
JORDAN 81,549 0,040 0,066 7,196 0,342 -1,199 
JAPAN 86,713 0,018 0,541 7,300 1,289 -0,270 
KAZAKHSTAN 54,452 0,662 0,590  -0,834  
KENYA 22,271 0,886 0,777 6,538 -0,918 -0,070 
KYRGYZSTAN 35,317 0,595 0,447  -1,107 0,477 
CAMBODIA 19,387 0,210 0,096  -1,098 0,913 
KUWAIT 98,210 0,344 0,674 6,979 0,557 -0,281 
LAO PDR 29,145 0,638 0,545  -0,973 -1,214 
LIBERIA 46,588 0,904 0,488  -1,284 1,289 
LIBYA 77,163 0,076 0,057  -0,948 0,562 
SRI LANKA 18,365 0,464 0,485 6,067 0,063 0,782 
LESOTHO 22,962 0,254 0,721  -0,193 -0,059 
LITHUANIA 66,751 0,322 0,414 6,374 0,621 0,802 
LUXEMBOURG 87,110 0,644 0,091 7,647 1,804 -0,568 
LATVIA 67,812 0,580 0,556 6,659 0,625 0,127 
MOROCCO 56,034 0,468 0,003 5,920 -0,142 -1,113 
MOLDOVA 45,220 0,553 0,560  -0,467 0,666 
MADAGASCAR 30,007 0,020 0,519 5,203 -0,519 0,156 
MALDIVES 35,617    -0,109 1,205 
MEXICO 76,747 0,151 0,180 6,149 -0,505 -0,312 
MALI 33,280 0,839 0,182 5,653 -0,355  
MALTA 93,893 0,091 0,122 6,384 1,435 0,817 
MYANMAR 29,771 0,507 0,197 3,370 -1,480  
MONGOLIA 63,941 0,373 0,080  -0,226 -0,371 
MOZAMBIQUE 30,310 0,812 0,676  -0,636 0,612 
MAURITANIA 54,118 0,326 0,015  -0,727 -0,553 
MAURITIUS 41,312 0,455 0,638 7,306 0,948  
MALAWI 15,219 0,602 0,819 4,500 -0,225 0,345 
MALAYSIA 67,816 0,597 0,666 6,656 0,499 -0,157 
NAMIBIA 38,218 0,701 0,663 6,266 0,178 -1,549 
NIGER 17,040 0,652 0,201 5,480 -0,679  
NICARAGUA 56,364 0,047 0,429 6,447 -0,753 -1,752 
NETHERLANDS 83,628 0,514 0,722 7,982 1,767  
NORWAY 78,085 0,067 0,205 7,237 1,914 -1,907 
NEPAL 15,687 0,717 0,142 5,647 -0,729  
NEW ZEALAND 86,046 0,166 0,811 8,204 1,849 -0,486 
PAKISTAN 35,355 0,719 0,385 5,455 -0,855 -0,200 
PANAMA 64,100 0,387 0,334 7,275 -0,150 -0,740 
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PERU 75,570 0,336 0,199 6,823 -0,647 0,546 
PHILIPPINES 46,221 0,836 0,306 7,072 -0,497 0,818 
NORTH KOREA 59,942 0,003 0,489  -1,151  
PALAU 78,930 0,316 0,715  0,846 -0,594 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA 13,083 0,353 0,552 5,893 -0,978 -0,925 
POLAND 61,259 0,047 0,171 5,742 0,568 0,432 
PORTUGAL 58,419 0,020 0,144 7,286 1,100 1,042 
PARAGUAY 57,590 0,598 0,212 6,306 -0,995 -1,381 
QATAR 97,780 0,480 0,095  0,758 0,202 
ROMANIA 53,420 0,172 0,237 4,743 -0,081 -0,673 
RUSSIA 73,546 0,249 0,440 4,492 -0,876 0,952 
RWANDA 20,768  0,507 4,612 -0,624  
SAUDI ARABIA 81,304 0,095 0,127  0,161 -0,579 
SUDAN 32,885 0,719 0,431  -1,366 -0,312 
SENEGAL 41,532 0,696 0,150 5,806 -0,208 0,782 
SINGAPORE 100,000 0,384 0,656 8,565 1,635 1,022 
SOLOMON ISLANDS 18,534 0,525 0,671  -0,852 -0,056 
SIERRA LEONE 37,310 0,763 0,540 5,195 -1,068 0,820 
EL SALVADOR 62,413  0,356 7,204 -0,660 -0,718 
SERBIA 54,601    -0,646 -0,465 
SAO TOME & PRINCIPE 59,023 0,232 0,187  -0,576 -0,231 
SLOVENIA 50,341 0,220 0,287 6,006 0,958 -2,618 
SLOVAKIA 55,250 0,255 0,565 5,885 0,455 0,166 
SWEDEN 84,629 0,197 0,234 7,358 1,890 -0,647 
SWAZILAND 21,909 0,172 0,444  -0,643 1,174 
SEYCHELLES 51,506 0,161 0,232  0,133 1,142 
SYRIA 54,366 0,182 0,431 4,958 -0,647 -1,267 
CHAD 21,874 0,864 0,641 5,322 -1,384 -0,529 
TOGO 35,905 0,898 0,660 5,028 -0,920 -0,103 
THAILAND 39,550 0,634 0,099 6,642 0,007 -0,517 
TAJIKISTAN 26,483 0,547 0,339  -1,186 -0,863 
TIMOR LESTE 27,484 0,526 0,425  -1,007  
TONGA 23,244 0,378 0,621  0,174 0,027 
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO 9,676 0,125 0,794 7,149 -0,073 -0,802 
TUNISIA 65,207 0,012 0,010 6,058 0,025 0,062 
TURKEY 68,630 0,222 0,005 5,729 0,067  
TANZANIA 25,937 0,898 0,633 5,794 -0,415 -0,510 
UGANDA 13,544 0,923 0,633 6,425 -0,472 0,752 
UKRAINE 68,091 0,474 0,616 4,488 -0,821 0,322 
URUGUAY 93,605 0,082 0,355 6,650 0,552 1,153 
UNITED STATES 80,177 0,251 0,824 8,534 1,557 -1,100 
VENEZUELA 88,591 0,069 0,135 5,776 -1,440  
VIETNAM 28,254 0,238 0,508  -0,448 -1,583 
YEMEN 29,800 0,008 0,002  -1,190 -1,212 
SOUTH AFRICA 60,335 0,865 0,860 6,725 0,095 -0,038 
ZAMBIA 37,276 0,873 0,736 6,311 -0,482 0,389 
ZIMBABWE 33,693 0,447 0,736 4,794 -1,695 -0,690 
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Fuzzied/Calibrated Data 
Country name Country code hdi polity2 fhi gdpcap inv inf 
AFGHANISTAN AFG 0,97 0,07 0,8  0,18 0,71 
ANGOLA AGO 0,99 0,23 0,86 0,31 0,04 0,99 
ALBANIA ALB 0,5 0,7 0,43 0,4 0,83 0,26 
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES ARE 0,08 0,02 0,86 0,97 0,52 0,58 
ARGENTINA ARG 0,35 0,7 0,29 0,75 0,16 0,93 
ARMENIA ARM 0,67 0,47 0,65 0,27 0,84 0,34 
AUSTRALIA AUS 0,1 1 0 0,87 0,82 0,32 
AUSTRIA AUT 0,23 1 0 0,91 0,6 0,08 
AZERBAIJAN AZE 0,78 0,07 0,86 0,3 0,85 0,74 
BURUNDI BDI 0,97 0,43 0,64 0,01 0,21 0,88 
BELGIUM BEL 0 0,82 0 0,88 0,55 0,11 
BENIN BEN 0,87 0,57 0,31 0,14 0,33 0,25 
BANGLADESH BGD 0,89 0,4 0,53 0,15 0,73 0,53 
BULGARIA BGR 0,47 0,78 0,2 0,46 0,72 0,41 
BAHRAIN BHR 0,1 0,03 0,76 0,82 0,65 0,56 
BAHAMAS BHS 0,03  0 0,86 0,74 0,05 
BELIZE BLZ 0,42  0 0,61 0,29 0,05 
BOLIVIA BOL 0,43 0,65 0,38 0,35 0,08 0,53 
BRAZIL BRA 0,48 0,7 0,31 0,62 0,17 0,63 
BARBADOS BRB 0,12  0 0,79 0,1 0,07 
BRUNEI BRN 0,06  0,91 0,83 0,05 0,51 
BOTSWANA BWA 0,88 0,7 0,33 0,59 0,93 0,61 
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC CAF 0,41 0,33 0,69 0,09 0,01 0,03 
CANADA CAN 0,11 1 0 0,9 0,5 0,17 
SWITZERLAND CHE 0,06 1 0 0,99 0,64 0,01 
CHILE CHL 0,5 0,86 0,18 0,7 0,5 0,45 
CHINA CHN 0,86 0,07 1 0,34 0,98 0,36 
CïTE D IVOIRE CIV 0,73 0,35 0,86 0,29 0,03 0,32 
CAMEROON CMR 0,76 0,17 0,9 0,26 0,2 0,2 
CONGO, DEM. R. COD 0,9 0,39 0,81 0,19 0,06 1 
CONGO COG 0,66 0,15 0,79 0,36 0,56 0,68 
COLOMBIA COL 0,43 0,59 0,48 0,56 0,34 0,57 
COSTA RICA CRI 0,39 1 0 0,64 0,43 0,69 
CAPE VERDE CSS 0,59 0,87 0 0,4 0,99 0,04 
CUBA CUB 0,52 0,07 1 0,56 0,02 0,18 
CYPRUS CYP 0,23 1 0 0,81 0,25 0,19 
CZECH REP. CZE 0,33 0,85 0 0,72 0,86 0,09 
GERMANY DEU 0,31 1 0 0,89 0,28 0,01 
DOMINICA DMA 0,09  0 0,69 0,13 0,28 
DENMARK DNK 0,19 1 0 0,95 0,39 0,14 
DOMINICAN REP. DOM 0,44 0,7 0,29 0,57 0,46 0,81 
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ALGERIA DZA 0,7 0,34 0,86 0,48 0,97 0,73 
ECUADOR ECU 0,37 0,5 0,41 0,43 0,62 0,59 
EGYPT EGY 0,51 0,16 0,81 0,44 0,18 0,71 
SPAIN ESP 0,21 1 0 0,83 0,77 0,18 
ESTONIA EST 0,41 0,82 0 0,65 0,9 0,44 
ETHIOPIA ETH 0,99 0,28 0,72 0 0,9 0,84 
FINLAND FIN 0,17 1 0 0,91 0,54 0,08 
FIJI FJI 0,34 0,32 0,69 0,53 0,33 0,23 
FRANCE FRA 0,14 0,82 0 0,87 0,49 0,06 
GABON GAB 0,3 0,29 0,77 0,66 0,76 0,55 
UNITED KINGDOM GBR 0,04 1 0 0,93 0,16 0,16 
GHANA GHA 0,81 0,6 0,19 0,1 0,68 0,98 
GAMBIA GMB 0,74 0,14 0,68 0,28 0,37 0,47 
EQUATORIAL GUINEA GNQ 0,77 0,14 0,97 0,52 1 0,86 
GREECE GRC 0,32 1 0,18 0,8 0,41 0,13 
GUATEMALA GTM 0,71 0,7 0,48 0,47 0,15 0,4 
GUYANA GUY 0,63 0,53 0,29 0,34 0,59 0,82 
HONDURAS HND 0,57 0,59 0,46 0,38 0,8 0,62 
CROATIA HRV 0,45 0,76 0,22 0,7 0,67 0,29 
HAITI HTI 0,48 0,35 0,66 0,2 0,84 0,83 
HUNGARY HUN 0,25 1 0 0,68 0,58 0,43 
INDONESIA IDN 0,64 0,62 0,35 0,32 0,82 0,79 
INDIA IND 0,85 0,82 0,26 0,22 0,94 0,49 
IRELAND IRL 0,14 1 0 0,93 0,54 0,12 
IRAN IRN 0,72 0,18 0,86 0,45 0,95 0,94 
IRAQ IRQ 0,26 0,23 0,91  0,25 0,85 
ICELAND ISL 0,13  0 0,96 0,44 0,42 
ISRAEL ISR 0,16 1 0 0,85 0,27 0,1 
ITALY ITA 0,25 1 0,16 0,85 0,32 0,14 
JAMAICA JAM 0,29 0,82 0,26 0,6 0,66 0,75 
JORDAN JOR 0,24 0,22 0,72 0,48 0,75 0,44 
JAPAN JPN 0,08 1 0 0,98 0,44 0 
KAZAKHSTAN KAZ 0,62 0,11 0,86 0,41 0,81 0,88 
KENYA KEN 0,8 0,56 0,59 0,18 0,22 0,65 
KYRGYZSTAN KGZ 0,34 0,36 0,74 0,11 0,56 0,79 
CAMBODIA KHM 0,92 0,37 0,86 0,12 0,19 0,31 
KUWAIT KWT 0,01 0,07 0,6 0,84 0,08 0,7 
LAO PDR LAO 0,84 0,07 1 0,13 0,67 0,72 
LIBERIA LBR 0,86 0,41 0,6 0,05 0,14 0,52 
LIBYA LBY 0,21 0,13 0,94 0,73 0,14 0,91 
SRI LANKA LKA 0,56 0,44 0,57 0,32 0,76 0,76 
LESOTHO LSO 0,52 0,64 0,37 0,19 0,89 0,56 
LITHUANIA LTU 0,55 1 0,16 0,58 0,38 0,27 
LUXEMBOURG LUX 0,02 1 0 1 0,24 0,21 
LATVIA LVA 0,61 0,7 0,2 0,6 0,87 0,49 
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MOROCCO MAR 0,79 0,12 0,66 0,42 0,92 0,03 
MOLDOVA MDA 0,59 0,75 0,4 0,15 0,8 0,81 
MADAGASCAR MDG 0,54 0,48 0,58 0,08 0,45 0,75 
MALDIVES MDV 0,77  0,68 0,55 0,73 0,38 
MEXICO MEX 0,39 0,7 0,33 0,74 0,48 0,45 
MALI MLI 0,95 0,55 0,38 0,07 0,46 0,36 
MALTA MLT 0,35  0 0,78 0,12 0,25 
MYANMAR MMR 0,92 0,1 0,96  0,03 0,97 
MONGOLIA MNG 0,83 1 0,23 0,23 0,97 0,87 
MOZAMBIQUE MOZ 0,98 0,45 0,46 0,06 0,31 0,69 
MAURITANIA MRT 0,66 0,19 0,77 0,17 0,92 0,67 
MAURITIUS MUS 0,65 1 0 0,63 0,63 0,39 
MALAWI MWI 0,85 0,51 0,51 0,03 0,29 0,96 
MALAYSIA MYS 0,36 0,42 0,62 0,64 0,57 0,35 
NAMIBIA NAM 0,63 0,53 0,26 0,52 0,51 0,62 
NIGER NER 0,94 0,45 0,49 0,03 0,7 0,33 
NICARAGUA NIC 0,58 0,75 0,51 0,36 0,65 0,68 
NETHERLANDS NLD 0,17 1 0 0,92 0,35 0,1 
NORWAY NOR 0,07 1 0 0,99 0,47 0,4 
NEPAL NPL 0,83 0,38 0,62 0,07 0,86 0,6 
NEW ZEALAND NZL 0,12 1 0 0,81 0,42 0,19 
PAKISTAN PAK 0,82 0,31 0,69 0,24 0,12 0,82 
PANAMA PAN 0,37 0,82 0,16 0,62 0,41 0,27 
PERU PER 0,38 0,77 0,26 0,5 0,4 0,29 
PHILIPPINES PHL 0,28 0,7 0,39 0,37 0,27 0,37 
NORTH KOREA PKR 0,46 0 1    
PALAU PLW 0,15  0 0,76  0,42 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA PNG 0,75 0,42 0,43 0,3 0,37 0,48 
POLAND POL 0,26 0,87 0 0,67 0,35 0,24 
PORTUGAL PRT 0,22 1 0 0,79 0,52 0,15 
PARAGUAY PRY 0,4 0,65 0,45 0,44 0,09 0,66 
QATAR QAT 0,19 0 0,86 0,95 0,96 0,78 
ROMANIA ROU 0,6 0,77 0,29 0,46 0,69 0,92 
RUSSIA RUS 0,45 0,47 0,79 0,49 0,42 0,92 
RWANDA RWA 1 0,2 0,92 0,05 0,24 0,64 
SAUDI ARABIA SAU 0,65 0 1 0,77 0,59 0,5 
SUDAN SDN 0,88 0,17 1 0,17 0,71 0,94 
SENEGAL SEN 0,81 0,64 0,35 0,23 0,61 0,16 
SINGAPORE SGP 0,68 0,25 0,63 0,89 0,78 0,02 
SOLOMON ISLANDS SLB 0,05 0,54 0,55 0,38 0 0,54 
SIERRA LEONE SLE 0,93 0,49 0,49 0,02 0,07 0,9 
EL SALVADOR SLV 0,49 0,61 0,26 0,54 0,07 0,22 
SERBIA SRB 0,15 0,7 0,36 0,33 0,48 0,97 
SAO TOME & PRINCIPE STP 0,68  0,23 0,26 0,99 0,86 
SLOVENIA SVN 0,27 1 0 0,77 0,75 0,31 
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SLOVAKIA SVN 0,32 0,86 0 0,71 0,79 0,23 
SWEDEN SWE 0,01 1 0 0,94 0,53 0,06 
SWAZILAND SWZ 0,28 0,02 0,95 0,42 0,05 0,64 
SEYCHELLES SYC 0,03  0,41 0,75 0,88 0,77 
SYRIA SYR 0,46 0,04 1 0,39 0,3 0,55 
CHAD TCD 0,91 0,25 0,94 0,04 0,91 0,51 
TOGO TGO 0,55 0,2 0,72 0,11 0,1 0,3 
THAILAND THA 0,61 0,52 0,55 0,51 0,78 0,21 
TAJIKISTAN TJK 0,72 0,21 0,86 0,01 0,11 0,95 
TIMOR LESTE TLS 0,96 0,58 0,48 0,21 0,95 0,38 
TONGA TON 0,2  0,62 0,5 0,69 0,46 
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO TTO 0,54 1 0,35 0,72 0,31 0,47 
TUNISIA TUN 0,57 0,27 0,76 0,54 0,63 0,34 
TURKEY TUR 0,75 0,62 0,44 0,66 0,26 0,95 
TANZANIA TZA 0,94 0,31 0,55 0,13 0,71 0,8 
UGANDA UGA 0,9 0,24 0,72 0,09 0,58 0,73 
UKRAINE UKR 0,53 0,56 0,53 0,28 0,39 0,89 
URUGUAY URY 0,3 1 0 0,74 0,2 0,6 
UNITED STATES USA 0,05 1 0 0,97 0,36 0,12 
VENEZUELA VEN 0,69 0,38 0,58 0,68 0,61 0,99 
VIETNAM VNM 0,7 0,07 1 0,21 0,93 0,77 
YEMEN YEM 0,79 0,3 0,75 0,25 0,22 0,84 
SOUTH AFRICA ZAF 0,18 0,82 0,21 0,58 0,23 0,58 
ZAMBIA ZMB 0,95 0,5 0,53 0,16 0,88 0,9 
ZIMBABWE ZWE 0,74 0,27 0,93 0,25 0,01 0,66 
 
countryname open govsize yrsch life popn gini 
AFGHANISTAN 0,5 0,28 0,06 0,17 0,92 0,06 
ANGOLA 0,82 0,89  0,03 0,95 0,85 
ALBANIA 0,45 0,14 0,73 0,75 0,03 0,14 
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 0,87 0,04 0,57 0,76 0,99  
ARGENTINA 0,03 0,34 0,58 0,73 0,34 0,81 
ARMENIA 0,37 0,26 0,86 0,6 0,06 0,23 
AUSTRALIA 0,08 0,62 0,94 0,96 0,52 0,33 
AUSTRIA 0,66 0,78 0,64 0,92 0,19 0,11 
AZERBAIJAN 0,58 0,15  0,37 0,43 0 
BURUNDI 0,07 0,91 0,04 0,09 0,94 0,27 
BELGIUM 0,92 0,92 0,85 0,86 0,28 0,26 
BENIN 0,14 0,3 0,08 0,19 0,92 0,59 
BANGLADESH 0,08 0,01 0,21 0,35 0,48 0,25 
BULGARIA 0,73 0,61 0,7 0,62 0,02 0,22 
BAHRAIN 0,86 0,47 0,49 0,76 0,99  
BAHAMAS 0,64 0,37  0,65 0,64  
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BELIZE 0,79 0,48 0,83 0,54 0,79  
BOLIVIA 0,32 0,49 0,56 0,31 0,63 0,94 
BRAZIL 0,01 0,84 0,39 0,5 0,4 0,94 
BARBADOS 0,62 0,59 0,6 0,69 0,2  
BRUNEI 0,72 0,88 0,55 0,8 0,65  
BOTSWANA 0,64 0,84 0,61 0,12 0,43 0,98 
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 0,05 0,16 0,09 0,01 0,66 0,84 
CANADA 0,34 0,85 0,92 0,97 0,37 0,3 
SWITZERLAND 0,75 0,2 0,79 0,99 0,32 0,24 
CHILE 0,35 0,25 0,66 0,84 0,38 0,9 
CHINA 0,23 0,43 0,44 0,65 0,23 0,6 
CïTE D IVOIRE 0,56 0,06 0,16 0,05 0,63 0,65 
CAMEROON 0,1 0,2 0,26 0,13 0,8 0,62 
CONGO, DEM. R. 0,27 0,07 0,1 0,04 0,86 0,73 
CONGO 0,89 0,4 0,3 0,14 0,83 0,7 
COLOMBIA 0,06 0,57 0,43 0,58 0,55 0,95 
COSTA RICA 0,58 0,51 0,51 0,86 0,6 0,83 
CAPE VERDE 0,66 0,64  0,46 0,36 0,76 
CUBA 0,04 0,99 0,63 0,83 0,12  
CYPRUS 0,69 0,67 0,81 0,9 0,55  
CZECH REP. 0,78 0,82 1 0,78 0,12 0,02 
GERMANY 0,44 0,72 0,82 0,89 0,08 0,17 
DOMINICA 0,55 0,57   0,14  
DENMARK 0,63 0,97 0,89 0,82 0,17 0,01 
DOMINICAN REP. 0,31 0,09 0,44 0,55 0,51 0,83 
ALGERIA 0,32 0,51 0,29 0,44 0,57  
ECUADOR 0,25 0,28 0,47 0,72 0,62 0,87 
EGYPT 0,17 0,29 0,34 0,43 0,58 0,2 
SPAIN 0,21 0,68 0,64 0,95 0,41 0,33 
ESTONIA 0,9 0,68 0,98 0,51 0,05 0,28 
ETHIOPIA 0,1 0,44  0,14 0,84 0,19 
FINLAND 0,47 0,9 0,67 0,85 0,15 0,07 
FIJI 0,83 0,58 0,78 0,4 0,26 0,74 
FRANCE 0,19 0,93 0,77 0,95 0,26 0,18 
GABON 0,6 0,13 0,46 0,25 0,74 0,63 
UNITED KINGDOM 0,25 0,83 0,8 0,87 0,27 0,49 
GHANA 0,57 0,36 0,38 0,2 0,77 0,67 
GAMBIA 0,31 0,1 0,04 0,18 0,94 0,77 
EQUATORIAL GUINEA 0,99 0,01  0,08 0,9  
GREECE 0,2 0,79 0,62 0,88 0,11 0,34 
GUATEMALA 0,29 0,12 0,17 0,41 0,77 0,91 
GUYANA 0,98 0,8 0,54 0,33 0,22  
HONDURAS 0,82 0,55 0,28 0,52 0,7 0,96 
CROATIA 0,51 0,78 0,76 0,68 0,05 0,17 
HAITI 0,27 0,07 0,2 0,21 0,53 0,97 
65	  
	  
HUNGARY 0,92 0,88 0,94 0,59 0,06 0,09 
INDONESIA 0,23 0,08 0,25 0,39 0,5 0,35 
INDIA 0,09 0,24 0,24 0,29 0,52 0,29 
IRELAND 0,95 0,6 0,89 0,81 0,54 0,25 
IRAN 0,16 0,36 0,48 0,47 0,46 0,52 
IRAQ 0,68 0,65 0,33 0,56 0,82 0,1 
ICELAND 0,52 0,95 0,76 0,98 0,41 0,06 
ISRAEL 0,44 0,94 0,96 0,94 0,7 0,6 
ITALY 0,16 0,77 0,59 0,99 0,17 0,44 
JAMAICA 0,59 0,5 0,68 0,52 0,16 0,93 
JORDAN 0,84 0,89 0,56 0,63 0,72 0,38 
JAPAN 0,02 0,73 0,91 1 0,1 0,21 
KAZAKHSTAN 0,56 0,23 0,87 0,37 0,35 0,13 
KENYA 0,22 0,53 0,31 0,16 0,83 0,79 
KYRGYZSTAN 0,76 0,66 0,72 0,42 0,44 0,31 
CAMBODIA 0,84 0,02 0,13 0,27 0,59 0,4 
KUWAIT 0,61 0,64 0,34 0,71 0,98  
LAO PDR 0,47 0,09 0,18 0,27 0,61 0,37 
LIBERIA 0,75 0,24 0,12 0,15 0,95 0,51 
LIBYA 0,54 0,45 0,42 0,63 0,5  
SRI LANKA 0,34 0,39 0,84 0,58 0,31 0,54 
LESOTHO 0,96 0,99 0,36 0,06 0,32 0,9 
LITHUANIA 0,77 0,8 0,74 0,64 0 0,32 
LUXEMBOURG 0,99 0,56 0,75 0,88 0,59  
LATVIA 0,71 0,74 0,71 0,5 0,01 0,4 
MOROCCO 0,42 0,69 0,15 0,42 0,39 0,57 
MOLDOVA 0,85 0,72 0,69 0,39 0,08 0,36 
MADAGASCAR 0,38 0,11  0,23 0,9 0,64 
MALDIVES 0,94 0,66 0,19 0,45 0,65 0,48 
MEXICO 0,24 0,22 0,5 0,75 0,47 0,8 
MALI 0,3 0,26 0,01 0,1 0,93 0,47 
MALTA 0,95 0,82 0,79 0,92 0,25  
MYANMAR 0  0,14 0,28 0,3  
MONGOLIA 0,8 0,41 0,53 0,31 0,46 0,37 
MOZAMBIQUE 0,39 0,43 0 0,07 0,81 0,75 
MAURITANIA 0,71 0,87 0,14 0,25 0,87 0,56 
MAURITIUS 0,79 0,41 0,41 0,62 0,21 0,42 
MALAWI 0,43 0,59 0,11 0,03 0,88 0,67 
MALAYSIA 0,97 0,32 0,66 0,69 0,68 0,69 
NAMIBIA 0,69 0,93 0,31 0,18 0,57 0,98 
NIGER 0,18 0,46 0,01 0,12 0,97 0,46 
NICARAGUA 0,49 0,05 0,26 0,48 0,49 0,68 
NETHERLANDS 0,86 0,95 0,9 0,91 0,19 0,12 
NORWAY 0,4 0,86 0,93 0,93 0,34 0,05 
NEPAL 0,12 0,11 0,07 0,29 0,54 0,52 
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NEW ZEALAND 0,28 0,7 0,99 0,93 0,39  
PAKISTAN 0,03 0,13 0,16 0,34 0,68 0,15 
PANAMA 0,91 0,34 0,59 0,78 0,66 0,92 
PERU 0,12 0,22 0,61 0,54 0,45 0,82 
PHILIPPINES 0,55 0,14 0,52 0,38 0,67 0,71 
NORTH KOREA    0,35 0,28  
PALAU 0,77   0,53 0,29  
PAPUA NEW GUINEA 0,81 0,54 0,11 0,24 0,74  
POLAND 0,46 0,7 0,84 0,74 0,09 0,29 
PORTUGAL 0,33 0,81 0,49 0,8 0,13  
PARAGUAY 0,68 0,16 0,37 0,49 0,69 0,89 
QATAR 0,6 0,47 0,4 0,84 1  
ROMANIA 0,48 0,05 0,81 0,59 0,01 0,1 
RUSSIA 0,21 0,63 0,91 0,36 0,07 0,53 
RWANDA 0,06 0,45 0,09 0,07 0,89 0,87 
SAUDI ARABIA 0,49 0,91 0,46 0,67 0,85  
SUDAN 0,05 0,27 0,06 0,22 0,75 0,39 
SENEGAL 0,36 0,42 0,02 0,22 0,85 0,56 
SINGAPORE 1 0,18 0,69 0,9 0,72  
SOLOMON ISLANDS 0,65 0,97  0,3 0,75  
SIERRA LEONE 0,19 0,21 0,05 0 0,91 0,48 
EL SALVADOR 0,38 0,18 0,39 0,46 0,21 0,78 
SERBIA 0,42 0,86 0,65 0,61 0,04 0,16 
SAO TOME & PRINCIPE 0,36 0,76  0,32 0,76 0,66 
SLOVENIA 0,81 0,75 0,96 0,79 0,15 0,02 
SLOVAKIA 0,93 0,71 0,95 0,7 0,1 0,04 
SWEDEN 0,53 0,96 0,97 0,97 0,24 0,03 
SWAZILAND 0,94 0,55 0,21 0,1 0,45 0,88 
SEYCHELLES 0,97 0,98   0,3 1 
SYRIA 0,41 0,38 0,22 0,71 0,78 0,41 
CHAD 0,51 0,03  0,05 0,97 0,63 
TOGO 0,62 0,17 0,24 0,16 0,81 0,71 
THAILAND 0,9 0,31 0,29 0,57 0,25 0,61 
TAJIKISTAN 0,74 0,19 0,88 0,33 0,71 0,21 
TIMOR LESTE 0,88 1  0,24 0,73 0,13 
TONGA 0,4 0,63 0,71 0,56 0,23  
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO 0,7 0,3 0,74 0,44 0,18  
TUNISIA 0,67 0,61 0,32 0,67 0,37 0,5 
TURKEY 0,15 0,38 0,35 0,48 0,48 0,55 
TANZANIA 0,13 0,52 0,23 0,11 0,88 0,44 
UGANDA 0,11 0,35 0,19 0,08 0,96 0,72 
UKRAINE 0,73 0,74 0,86 0,41 0,03 0,08 
URUGUAY 0,18 0,33 0,54 0,77 0,14 0,75 
UNITED STATES 0,01 0,53 0,99 0,82 0,33 0,58 
VENEZUELA 0,14 0,32 0,41 0,66 0,61 0,79 
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VIETNAM 0,88 0,03 0,27 0,73 0,42 0,45 
YEMEN 0,45 0,39 0,03 0,26 0,79 0,43 
SOUTH AFRICA 0,26 0,76 0,51 0,2 0,56 0,99 
ZAMBIA 0,29 0 0,36 0,01 0,86 0,86 
ZIMBABWE 0,53 0,49 0,45 0,02 0,35  
	  	  
countryname urb ethno rol stab 
AFGHANISTAN 0,11 0,89 0 0,08 
ANGOLA 0,26 0,91 0,05 0,77 
ALBANIA 0,39 0,27 0,31  
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 0,86 0,71 0,72 0,61 
ARGENTINA 0,95 0,32 0,34  
ARMENIA 0,58 0,15 0,49 0,86 
AUSTRALIA 0,93 0,08 0,94 0,23 
AUSTRIA 0,62 0,11 0,97 0,91 
AZERBAIJAN 0,43 0,25 0,25 0,37 
BURUNDI 0,01 0,34 0,09 0,3 
BELGIUM 0,98 0,65 0,88 0,63 
BENIN 0,3 0,92 0,4 0,82 
BANGLADESH 0,14 0,03 0,22 0,5 
BULGARIA 0,72 0,44 0,57 0,04 
BAHRAIN 0,94 0,55 0,71 0,88 
BAHAMAS 0,85 0,49 0,83 0,1 
BELIZE 0,34 0,81 0,52 0,79 
BOLIVIA 0,6 0,87 0,25 0,87 
BRAZIL 0,87 0,61 0,51 0,55 
BARBADOS 0,19 0,17 0,86 0,84 
BRUNEI 0,75 0,61 0,74 0,45 
BOTSWANA 0,48 0,45 0,75 0,97 
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 0,28 0,95 0,04 0,61 
CANADA 0,83 0,83 0,93 0,94 
SWITZERLAND 0,73 0,59 0,96 0,72 
CHILE 0,92 0,22 0,86 0,04 
CHINA 0,32 0,18 0,48 0,34 
CïTE D IVOIRE 0,37 0,94 0,07 0,55 
CAMEROON 0,39 0,97 0,12 0,74 
CONGO, DEM. R. 0,27 0,98 0,02  
CONGO 0,56 0,98 0,1 0,69 
COLOMBIA 0,75 0,68 0,41 0,01 
COSTA RICA 0,65 0,28 0,7 0,67 
CAPE VERDE 0,52 0,47 0,68 0,06 
CUBA 0,77 0,67 0,27 0,83 
CYPRUS 0,67 0,09 0,84 0,93 
CZECH REP. 0,72 0,36 0,8 0,43 
GERMANY 0,74 0,19 0,91 0,58 
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DOMINICA 0,63 0,24 0,77 0,26 
DENMARK 0,9 0,07 0,99 0,85 
DOMINICAN REP. 0,71 0,49 0,33 0,2 
ALGERIA 0,61 0,38 0,3 0,98 
ECUADOR 0,57 0,74 0,17 0,48 
EGYPT 0,32 0,21 0,55 0,42 
SPAIN 0,8 0,47 0,85  
ESTONIA 0,69 0,55 0,83 0,53 
ETHIOPIA 0,04 0,85 0,28 1 
FINLAND 0,86 0,16 1 0,56 
FIJI 0,41 0,63 0,43 0,65 
FRANCE 0,79 0,1 0,88 0,57 
GABON 0,88 0,89 0,45 0,19 
UNITED KINGDOM 0,83 0,15 0,92 0,75 
GHANA 0,38 0,77 0,59  
GAMBIA 0,44 0,91 0,5 0,81 
EQUATORIAL GUINEA 0,28 0,39 0,08 0,71 
GREECE 0,76 0,19 0,77 0,66 
GUATEMALA 0,37 0,57 0,14 0,25 
GUYANA 0,15 0,7 0,39 0,34 
HONDURAS 0,4 0,23 0,19 0,73 
CROATIA 0,5 0,41 0,63 0,64 
HAITI 0,35 0,09 0,03 0,85 
HUNGARY 0,64 0,17 0,79 0,16 
INDONESIA 0,36 0,85 0,32 0,01 
INDIA 0,16 0,48 0,61 0,15 
IRELAND 0,55 0,14 0,92 0,66 
IRAN 0,68 0,77 0,26 0,91 
IRAQ 0,7 0,41 0,01 0,09 
ICELAND 0,96 0,06 0,95 0,15 
ISRAEL 0,95 0,39 0,81 0,39 
ITALY 0,66 0,13 0,69 0,89 
JAMAICA 0,43 0,45 0,47  
JORDAN 0,85 0,67 0,67 0,12 
JAPAN 0,91 0 0,87 0,39 
KAZAKHSTAN 0,46 0,69 0,24  
KENYA 0,09 0,95 0,21 0,45 
KYRGYZSTAN 0,22 0,79 0,13 0,64 
CAMBODIA 0,06 0,26 0,14 0,88 
KUWAIT 0,99 0,75 0,73 0,38 
LAO PDR 0,15 0,58 0,18 0,11 
LIBERIA 0,35 0,99 0,08 0,99 
LIBYA 0,79 0,93 0,19 0,69 
SRI LANKA 0,05 0,46 0,62 0,76 
LESOTHO 0,1 0,32 0,54 0,46 
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LITHUANIA 0,63 0,37 0,75 0,78 
LUXEMBOURG 0,92 0,59 0,95 0,28 
LATVIA 0,65 0,65 0,76 0,51 
MOROCCO 0,49 0,52 0,56 0,13 
MOLDOVA 0,33 0,64 0,46 0,72 
MADAGASCAR 0,18 0,99 0,41 0,52 
MALDIVES 0,23  0,57 0,99 
MEXICO 0,78 0,62 0,42 0,36 
MALI 0,21 0,79 0,5  
MALTA 0,97 0,02 0,89 0,8 
MYANMAR 0,17 0,56 0,03  
MONGOLIA 0,59 0,4 0,52 0,35 
MOZAMBIQUE 0,19 0,8 0,37 0,7 
MAURITANIA 0,45 0,69 0,3 0,28 
MAURITIUS 0,3 0,51 0,81  
MALAWI 0,03 0,78 0,53 0,59 
MALAYSIA 0,66 0,66 0,7 0,42 
NAMIBIA 0,26 0,71 0,66 0,07 
NIGER 0,05 0,73 0,32  
NICARAGUA 0,5 0,53 0,28 0,03 
NETHERLANDS 0,88 0,11 0,94  
NORWAY 0,81 0,05 0,99 0,02 
NEPAL 0,03 0,76 0,29  
NEW ZEALAND 0,9 0,43 0,97 0,32 
PAKISTAN 0,23 0,82 0,23 0,41 
PANAMA 0,59 0,63 0,55 0,2 
PERU 0,77 0,75 0,35 0,68 
PHILIPPINES 0,34 0,29 0,43 0,8 
NORTH KOREA 0,54 0,01 0,12  
PALAU 0,81 0,5 0,79 0,26 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA 0,01 0,33 0,17 0,17 
POLAND 0,55 0,13 0,74 0,62 
PORTUGAL 0,52 0,03 0,85 0,93 
PARAGUAY 0,51 0,2 0,16 0,07 
QATAR 0,99 0,87 0,78 0,54 
ROMANIA 0,45 0,35 0,58 0,23 
RUSSIA 0,74 0,3 0,21 0,9 
RWANDA 0,07 0,37 0,38  
SAUDI ARABIA 0,84 0,21 0,65 0,27 
SUDAN 0,2 0,84 0,06 0,36 
SENEGAL 0,31 0,81 0,54 0,77 
SINGAPORE 1 0,42 0,9 0,92 
SOLOMON ISLANDS 0,06 0,12 0,23 0,47 
SIERRA LEONE 0,25 0,93 0,15 0,82 
EL SALVADOR 0,57 0,23 0,34 0,21 
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SERBIA 0,47  0,36 0,33 
SAO TOME & PRINCIPE 0,53  0,39 0,4 
SLOVENIA 0,41 0,27 0,82 0 
SLOVAKIA 0,48 0,31 0,68 0,53 
SWEDEN 0,89 0,05 0,98 0,24 
SWAZILAND 0,08 0,04 0,37 0,96 
SEYCHELLES 0,42 0,25 0,65 0,95 
SYRIA 0,46 0,6 0,35 0,09 
CHAD 0,08 0,96 0,06 0,29 
TOGO 0,24 0,83 0,2 0,44 
THAILAND 0,29 0,72 0,6 0,31 
TAJIKISTAN 0,12 0,57 0,11 0,18 
TIMOR LESTE 0,13  0,15  
TONGA 0,1 0,07 0,66 0,49 
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO 0 0,73 0,59 0,18 
TUNISIA 0,61 0,01 0,61 0,5 
TURKEY 0,7 0,35 0,63  
TANZANIA 0,12 0,86 0,48 0,31 
UGANDA 0,02 1 0,45 0,74 
UKRAINE 0,68 0,51 0,26 0,58 
URUGUAY 0,97 0,31 0,72 0,96 
UNITED STATES 0,82 0,53 0,9 0,14 
VENEZUELA 0,94 0,54 0,05  
VIETNAM 0,14 0,29 0,46 0,05 
YEMEN 0,17  0,1 0,12 
SOUTH AFRICA 0,54 0,88 0,64 0,47 
ZAMBIA 0,25 0,9 0,44 0,6 
ZIMBABWE 0,21 0,43 0,01 0,22 
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